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We address the question of whether two multiplayer strategic games are equivalent and
the computational complexity of deciding such a property. We introduce two notions of
isomorphisms, strong and weak. Each one of those isomorphisms preserves a different
structure of the game. Strong isomorphisms are defined to preserve the utility functions
and Nash equilibria. Weak isomorphisms preserve only the player’s preference relations
and thus pure Nash equilibria. We show that the computational complexity of the game
isomorphism problem depends on the level of succinctness of the description of the input
games but it is independent of which of the two types of isomorphisms is considered.
Utilities in games can be given succinctly by Turing machines, boolean circuits or boolean
formulas, or explicitly by tables. Actions can be given both explicitly or succinctly. When
the games are given in general form, we assume an explicit description of actions and a
succinct description of utilities. We show that the game isomorphism problem for general
form games is equivalent to the circuit isomorphism when utilities are described by TMs
and to the boolean formula isomorphismproblemwhen utilities are described by formulas.
When the game is given in explicit form, we show that the game isomorphism problem is
equivalent to the graph isomorphism problem.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Game Theory provides the mathematical tools and models to analyze strategic situations in which multiple participants
interact or affect each others. In the last years a huge amount of research has been devoted to explore the usefulness of
Game Theory in situations arising on the Internet. In those situations many participants interact with competing goals and
therefore can be modeled by strategic or cooperative games. Computational issues arising in this framework are one of the
main objectives of the Algorithmic Game Theory [18,16,25].
The informal idea of strategic equivalence [11] has been widely discussed and explored along the history of Game Theory.
Traditionally the notion of equivalence is studied at different levels using different types of isomorphism, depending on
the family of games and the structural properties to be preserved. In 1951, Nash [15] gave a definition of automorphism
between strategic games. Harsanyi and Selten have introduced other definitions of isomorphism [10] for strategic games.
Equivalence by theway of transformations to a common form have been considered in [6]. More recently, Peleg, Rosemuller,
and Sudhölter [19,26] have considered the notion of isomorphism for strategic and extensive games with incomplete
information. Another notion of isomorphism for extensive games has been introduced in [7]. Further results for cooperative
games can be found in [8].
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In this paper we are interested in the computational aspects of game equivalence for the case of strategic games. Our
motivation for selecting strategic games is twofold. First, strategic games are used as ingredients ofmore complicated games,
but usually there is a way to transform any game into a strategic game. Furthermore, in [6] equivalence between extensive
games is defined in terms of strategic games. Therefore strategic games are the first game structure to start analyzing game
equivalence. Second, the combinatorial structure of an strategic game is simple enough to allow such kind of analysis by
comparison with isomorphism on other combinatorial structures. In particular, to relate the problems with isomorphisms
for well studied structures as graphs [12], boolean formulas or boolean circuits [1,3,5].
In defining a concrete equivalence between gameswehave to pay attention to the structural properties that are preserved
in equivalent games. In this paper, we consider two versions of isomorphisms that preserve at different levels the structure
of the Nash equilibria. A strong isomorphism preserves utilities corresponding to the notion introduced in [15]. A weak
isomorphism preserves preferences. Each of them requires to preserve less information about the relative structure of
profiles while preserving still the structure of the Nash or pure Nash equilibria. More precisely, as wewill show later, strong
isomorphisms preserve pure and mixed Nash equilibria, while weak isomorphisms only preserve pure Nash equilibria.
In this paper we are interested in the computational complexity of deciding whether two games are equivalent. We
consider two problems related to isomorphisms. In the IsIso problem, given two games Γ and Γ ′ and amappingψ we have
to decide whetherψ is an isomorphism. In the Iso problem we have to decide whether two games are isomorphic. In order
to study the computational aspects of isomorphism problems on strategic games, we need first to determine the way in
which games and morphisms are represented as inputs to a program. For the representation of strategic games we adopt
the proposal given in [2] and consider the following two representations, each with a different level of succinctness. When
a game is given in general form the actions are listed explicitly but utilities and mappings are given by deterministic Turing
machines. In the explicit case utilities are stored in tables. In both cases morphisms are always represented by tables. This
is not a restriction as in polynomial time we can transform a morphism representation by Turing machines into a tabular
representation by tables, because the actions are given explicitly.
The main contributions of the paper are the following problem classification:
• The IsIso problem is coNP-complete, for games given in general form, and belongs toNCwhen games are given in explicit
form.
• The Iso problem belongs toΣp2 , for games given in general form, and to NPwhen games are given in explicit form.• The Iso problem is equivalent to the boolean circuit isomorphism problem, for games in general form, and to the graph
isomorphism problem, for games given in explicit form.
The above results hold independently of the type of isomorphism considered, observe that the boolean circuit isomorphism
problem is believed not to beΣp2 -hard [1], and that the graph isomorphism problem is conjectured not to be NP-hard [12].
Therefore the same results are valid for the Iso problem.
Besides the above generic forms of representing games we will also consider another particular class of strategic games,
that we call formula games. Our formula games are (as we will show) equivalent in power of representation to a subfamily
of the weighted boolean formula games introduced in [13]. We analyze the complexity of the Iso problem when the games
correspond to a general form, that is, the number of bits controlled by each player is a constant. For formula games in general
formwe show that the Iso problem is equivalent to boolean formula isomorphism. Recall that the complexity of the boolean
formula isomorphism problem is the same as that of circuit isomorphism, however it is conjectured that both problems are
not equivalent.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the definitions, problems and representations that will be
used through the paper, we also introduce the notion of game mapping and the definition of the different notions of game
isomorphism in which we are interested. In Section 3 we provide the complexity results for the case of strong isomorphism.
Section 4 is devoted to theweak isomorphism. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to state further results and open problems related
to isomorphism and game classification.
2. Definitions and preliminaries
In this section we provide the definitions and terminology used in the paper. We start with strategic games and their
representations. We continue with game mapping and the definition of the two types of isomorphism considered in this
work. We finalize this section with the definition of several computational problems.
Strategic games. We start stating the mathematical definition of strategic game as given in [17].
Definition 1. A strategic game Γ is a tuple (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N). The set of players is N = {1, . . . , n}. Player i ∈ N has a finite
set of actions Ai, we note ai any action belonging to Ai. The elements a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A1 × · · · × An are the strategy
profiles. The utility (or payoff ) function ui, for each player i ∈ N , is a mapping from A1 × · · · × An to the rationals.
In the context of computational complexity it is very important to fix how games are represented as problem inputs. In all
the different types of representations we always assume that the actions for each player are given explicitly, by listing all its
elements. This leads us to two types of representations depending on whether the utilities are given explicitly or succinctly.
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Our first representation is the generic representation of strategic games given in [2] where the payoff functions of a game
are described by a deterministic Turing Machine.
Strategic game in general form. The game Γ is given by a tuple
Γ = ⟨1n, A1, . . . , An,M, 1t⟩.
The game has n players, and for each player i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, their set of actions Ai is given by listing all its elements.
Given a strategy profile and a player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ui(a) is the output ofM on input ⟨a, i⟩ after t steps.
In [2] amore succinct representation of games is obtained by defining implicitly the sets of actions Ai as subsets of {0, 1}m.
In such a case a game Γ is given by ⟨1n, 1m,M, 1t⟩, which is called implicit form. For reasons that we clarify later, we do not
consider strategic games in implicit form.
Our second representation assumes that the payoff functions are given explicitly by means of a table.
Strategic game in explicit form. A game is given by a tuple
Γ = ⟨1n, A1, . . . , An, T ⟩,
where T is a table of dimensions |A1| × · · · × |An| × n. Given a strategy profile and a player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ui(a) = T [a][i].
In the following we consider strategic games in which the utility functions are described by boolean formulas. In [4],
player i has a goal ϕi to fulfill. Goals are usually described by boolean formulas. The utility of the player is binary. It is 1 if
the goal is satisfied and 0 otherwise. Along the lines suggested by circuit games [24] we consider the following family of
strategic games, whose representation is close to the general form.
Formula game in general form. A game is given by a tuple
Γ = ⟨1n, A1, . . . , An, 1ℓ, (ϕi,j)1≤i≤n,0≤j<ℓ⟩.
The set of actions for player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n is Ai = {0, 1}mi . The utility of player i is given by the boolean formulas
ϕi,j(a1, . . . , an) ∈ {0, 1}, 0 ≤ j < ℓ, by the equation ui(a1, . . . , an) =∑0≤j<ℓ ϕi,j(a1, . . . , an)2j.
Another model for strategic games that use boolean formula was introduced in [13], theweighted boolean formula games,
whose definition is the following:
Weighted boolean formula game (WBFG) [13]. A game is given by a tuple
Γ = ⟨1n, 1m, 1r , 1ℓ, (Fi)1≤i≤n⟩
where player i has Ai = {0, 1}m. For each player i, there is a set Fi = {(fi,1, wi,1), . . . , (fi,r , wi,r)} were, for 1 ≤ j ≤ r ,
fi,j : A1 × · · · × An → {0, 1}, 1 ≤ j ≤ r is a boolean formulas and wi,j ∈ {0, 1}ℓ. The utility of player i is computed by the
formula ui(a1, . . . , an) =∑(f ,w)∈Fi w · f (a1, . . . , an).
In the above definition the set of actions are described implicitly, in the rest of the paperwe restrict toWBFG in which the
set of actions are described explicitly. Following our previous notation we refer to such games as weighted boolean formula
games in general form.
Our first results shows that formula games and WBFG in general form are equivalent.
Lemma 1. Given a WBFG Γ = ⟨1n, 1r , 1ℓ, (Fi)1≤i≤n⟩ we can build in polynomial time in the size of Γ a Boolean Formula Game
Γ ′ = ⟨1n, 1ℓ, (ϕi,j)1≤i≤n,0≤j<ℓ⟩ with the same utilities and reciprocally.
Proof. In order to transform a boolean formula game into a WBFG just definewi,j = 2j and fi,j = ϕi,j.
To transform a WBFG to a formula game we need some formula constructions. Using a result given in [20] or [23], we
can easily build in polynomial time a nonuniform TC0 circuit IteratedSum(y1, . . . , yr) giving the sum of r numbers each one
of themwith k bits. Observe that the sum can be written with k+ log r bits. From the circuit for IteratedSum it can be easily
obtained a TC0 circuit giving the j-th bit of the iterated sum. As TC0 ⊆ NC1 and circuits in NC1 have logarithmic depth and
polynomial size, in polynomial time we can find a formula φj(y1, . . . , yr) giving the bit j of IteratedSum(y1, . . . , yr).
Now fix a player i and consider the set Fi = {(fi,1, wi,1), . . . (fi,r , wi,r)} such that, each wi has ℓ bits and fi : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}, we can compute in polynomial time in the size of Fi formulas ϕi,j(a), | ≤ j ≤ r . ϕi,j(a) provides the j-th bit of
IteratedSum(wi,1fi,1(a), . . . , wi,1fi,1(a)). Therefore, we have that u(a) =∑1≤i≤r wifi(a) =∑0≤j<ℓ+log r ϕj(a)2j. 
As a consequence of this equivalence our results for formula games will apply also to WBFG.
In the case that the number of players is constant, with respect to the number of actions, we can obtain an explicit
representation in polynomial time from a given general form representation, otherwise the transformation requires
exponential time.
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Game mappings. We consider game mappings that provide the way to associate players and their actions in one game to
players and actions in the other, as usual thosemappings are independent of the utilities.We adapt notations and definitions
given in [19,26].
Definition 2. Given Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) and Γ ′ = (N, (A′i)i∈N , (u′i)i∈N), a game mapping ψ from Γ to Γ ′ is a tuple
ψ = (π, (ϕi)i∈N)where π is a bijection from N to N , the player’s bijection and, for any i ∈ N , ϕi is a bijection from Ai to A′π(i),
the i-th player actions bijection.
Observe that the player bijection identifies player i ∈ N with player π(i) and the corresponding actions bijection ϕi
maps the set of actions of player i to the set of actions of player π(i). A game mapping ψ from Γ to Γ ′ induces, in a natural
way, a bijection from A1 × · · · × An to A′1 × · · · × A′n where strategy profile (a1, . . . , an) is mapped into the strategy profile
(a′1, . . . , a′n) defined as a
′
π(i) = ϕi(ai), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We note this mapping as ψ(a1, . . . , an) = (a′1, . . . , a′n), overloading
the use ofψ . A mixed strategy profile p = (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pn) is given by probabilities pi on Ai (such that∑ai∈Ai pi(ai) = 1)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A game mapping ψ also induces a mapping ψ(p1, . . . , pn) = (p′1, . . . , p′n) such that p′π(i) is a probability on
A′π(i) defined by p
′
π(i)(ϕi(ai)) = pi(ai). Isomorphisms are game mappings fulfilling some additional restrictions on utilities
or preferences as we will see later.
In order to describe a game mapping, we consider the less succinct approach. Observe that for the information on each
game, we have to keep only the set of actions for each player.
Game mapping in explicit form. All the components of the mapping is given explicitly, action sets are given by listing all its
elements and permutations are given by tables, that is
ψ = ⟨1n, A1, . . . , An, A′1, . . . , A′n, Tπ , Tϕ1 , . . . , Tϕn⟩
where Tπ , Tϕ1 , . . . , Tϕn are tables such that Tϕi [ai] = a′Tπ [i].
We have not considered the description of a mapping by Turing machines,
ψ = ⟨1n, A1, . . . , An, A′1, . . . , A′n,Mπ ,Mϕ1 , . . . ,Mϕn , 1t⟩
because in such a case we can construct an explicit coding of ψ with size bounded by 2|ψ | in time |ψ |2.
Game isomorphism. We start defining the stronger version of an isomorphism introduced by Nash [15] (see also [19,26]).
Definition 3. Given two strategic games Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) and Γ ′ = (N, (A′i))i∈N , (u′i)i∈N), a game mapping
ψ = (π, (ϕi)i∈N) is called a strong isomorphism ψ : Γ → Γ ′ when, for any player 1 ≤ i ≤ n and any strategy profile
a, it holds ui(a) = u′π(i)(ψ(a)). In the particular case that Γ ′ is Γ a strong isomorphism is called a strong automorphism.
In Example 1 we provide an example of strong isomorphism.
Example 1. Given the following games Γ and Γ ′
Player 1
Player 2
l r
t 0, 0 0, 1
b 1, 1 1, 0
Γ
ψ−→ Player 1
Player 2
l′ r ′
t ′ 1, 0 0, 1
b′ 0, 0 1, 1
Γ ′
Consider the morphism ψ : Γ → Γ ′ defined as ψ = (π, ϕ1, ϕ2) where π = (1 → 2, 2 → 1), ϕ1 = (t → l′, b → r ′) and
ϕ2 = (l → b′, r → t ′). This morphism maps strategy profiles as: ψ(t, l) = (b′, l′), ψ(t, r) = (t ′, l′), ψ(b, l) = (b′, r ′) and
ψ(b, r) = (t ′, r ′). Therefore it is a strong isomorphism.
Given a strong isomorphism ψ between Γ and Γ ′, observe that a mixed strategy profile p is a Nash equilibrium in Γ iff
ψ(p) is a Nash equilibrium in Γ ′ and, of course the same holds for pure Nash equilibria. Thus the bijection induced by strong
isomorphisms on the set ofmixed strategy profiles preserves the structure of the Nash equilibria. Observe that, furthermore,
a strong isomorphism induces an isomorphism among the Nash dynamics graphs of the two games.
There are several ways to relax the notion of strong isomorphismwhile maintaining the structure of Nash equilibria. For
instance, Harsanyi and Selten [10] substitute uπ(i)(ψ(a)) = ui(a) for uπ(i)(ψ(a)) = αiui(a)+ βi. In order to generalize this
approach we consider, following [17], game isomorphism in which the preference relations (≼i)i∈N induced by the utility
functions are preserved. We note strict preference as usual, a ≺i a′ iff a ≼i a′ but not a′ ≼i a. We note indifference by a ∼i a′,
as usual indifference occurs when a ≼i a′ and a′ ≼i a holds. The definition of isomorphism can be adapted to respect only
preference relations instead of utility functions.
Definition 4. A weak isomorphism ψ : Γ → Γ ′ is a mapping ψ = (π, (ϕi)i∈N) such that any triple a, a′ and i verifies:
a ≼i a′ iff ψ(a) ≼π(i) ψ(a′).
Example 2. We consider a ≼i a′ iff ui(a) ≤ ui(a′). Following here is an example of weak isomorphism ψ = (π, ϕ1, ϕ2).
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Player 1
Player 2
l r
t 0, 0 0, 1
b 1, 1 1, 0
Γ
ψ−→ Player 1
Player 2
l′ r ′
t ′ 3, 3 2, 2
b′ 2, 3 3, 2
Γ ′
where π = (1 → 2, 2 → 1), and ϕ1 = (t → r ′, b → l′), ϕ2 = (l → t ′, r → b′). Observe that ui(a) and ui(ψ(a)) are not
even related by a linear function.
Weak isomorphisms preserve preferences for any pair of strategy profiles and any player, therefore maintains the
structure of pure Nash equilibria.
We consider the following computational problems related to games and morphisms.
Is Game Isomorphism (IsIso). Given two games Γ , Γ ′ and a game mapping ψ : Γ → Γ ′, decide whether ψ is a game
isomorphism.
Game Isomorphism (Iso). Given two games Γ , Γ ′, decide whether there exists a game isomorphism between Γ and Γ ′.
The two problems can be formulated for strong and weak isomorphism and also for games in general form (strategic or
boolean formula) or games in explicit form. The game isomorphism problem can also be considered for the case in which
n = 1. For this particular case, the isomorphism problem is computationally easy.
Theorem 1. The Iso problem for games with one player is polynomial time solvable, for strong and weak isomorphism, and for
general form strategic and formula games and for explicit form games.
Proof. Consider a 1-player game Γ ({1}, A1, (u1)). Consider the vector x = (x1, . . . , xm) where xi = u1(i) and m = |A1|.
Define its characteristic vector S(Γ ) as the vector obtained after sorting x in increasing order. Thenwehave that two 1-player
games are strongly isomorphic iff their characteristic vectors are identical.
For the case of weak isomorphism the condition is equivalent to the fact that the relative order of two consecutive
elements is the same in both characteristic vectors.
The vector can be obtained in polynomial time for any of the considered game representation, and thus the problems can
be solved in polynomial time. 
Assumption. In view of the above result we assume for the rest of the paper that all the games have at least two players.
Other problems. Our coNP-hardness results follow from reductions from the following coNP-complete problem [9]:
Validity problem (Validity): Given a boolean formula F decide whether F is satisfiable by all truth assignments.
We also consider the following problems on boolean circuits. Recall that two circuits C1(x1, . . . , xn) and C2(x1, . . . , xn)
are isomorphic if there is a permutation π of {1, . . . , n} such that, for any truth assignment x ∈ {0, 1}n, C1(x) = C2(π(x)).
Boolean circuit isomorphism problem (CircuitIso): Given two boolean circuits C1 and C2 decide whether C1 and C2
are isomorphic.
A related problem is based on the notion of congruence. A congruence between two circuits on n variables, C1(x1, . . . , xn)
and C2(x1, . . . , xn) is a mapping ψ = (π, f1, . . . , fn), where π is a permutation of {1, . . . , n} and, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, fi is
a permutation on {0, 1} (either the identity or the negation function). As in the case of game morphism, the image ψ(x)
is obtained by permuting the positions of the input bits, according to permutation π , and then applying to any bit i the
permutation fi.
Boolean circuit congruence problem (CircuitCong): Given two circuits C1 and C2 decide whether C1 and C2 are
congruent.
The CircuitIso problem has been studied by Borchert et al. in [5]. Among many other results they show that CircuitIso
and CircuitCong are equivalent. It is known that CircuitIso ∈ Σp2 , but Agrawal and Thierauf prove that it cannot beΣp2 -hard
unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses (see Corollary 3.5 in [1]).
We also consider the isomorphism and congruence problems for boolean formulas. Recall that two formulas
Φ1(x1, . . . , xn) andΦ2(x1, . . . , xn) are isomorphic if there is a permutationπ of {1, . . . , n} such that, for any truth assignment
x ∈ {0, 1}n, C1(x) = C2(π(x)). They are congruent if there is a mapping ψ = (π, f1, . . . , fn), where π is a permutation
of {1, . . . , n} and, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, fi is a permutation on {0, 1} such that, for any truth assignment x ∈ {0, 1}n,
C1(x) = C2(π(x)).
Boolean formula isomorphism problem (FormulaIso): Given two boolean formulasΦ1 andΦ2 decide whetherΦ1
andΦ2 are isomorphic.
Boolean formula congruence problem (FormulaCong): Given two boolean formulasΦ1 andΦ2 decide whetherΦ1
andΦ2 are congruent.
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Borchet et al. in [5] show that FormulaIso and FormulaCong are equivalent. It is known that FormulaIso ∈ Σp2 . but it
cannot beΣp2 -hard unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses (see Corollary 3.4 in [1]).
Two graphs are isomorphic if there is a one-to-one correspondence between their vertices and there is an edge between
two vertices of one graph if and only if there is an edge between the two corresponding vertices in the other graph.
Graph isomorphism (GI): Given two graphs, decide whether they are isomorphic.
It is well known that GI is not expected to be NP-hard [12].
Notation. We finish this section with some additional definitions and notation. A binary actions game is a game in which the
set of actions for each player is {0, 1}. A binary game is a binary actions game in which the utility functions range is {0, 1}.
We will need to construct binary actions games associated to general games, for doing so we use a binify process on the
strategies of the original game.
Given a strategic game Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N), assume without loss of generality that N = {1, . . . , n} and that, for any
i ∈ N , Ai = {1, . . . , ki}. We ‘‘binify’’ an action j ∈ Ai, coding it with ki bits, as binify(j) = 0j−110ki−j. The binify process can be
used in a strategy profile, given a = (a1, . . . , an), we write binify(a) = (binify(a1), . . . , binify(an)). Observe that by setting
k = ∑i∈N ki, we have binify(a) ∈ A′ = {0, 1}k. We define good(A′) = {binify(a)|a ∈ A} and bad(A′) = A′ \ good(A′). Note
that binify : A → good(A′) is a bijection and therefore the inverse function is also a bijection.
Example 3. Given Γ with 3 players A1 = A3 = {1, 2} and A2 = {1, 2, 3} we have binify(1, 2, 2) = (10, 010, 01) =
(1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1) and binify−1(10, 010, 01) = (1, 2, 2).
3. Complexity results for strong isomorphisms
Let us start with the complexity for the IsIso problem.
Theorem 2. The IsIso problem for strong isomorphisms is coNP-complete for strategic games in general form and for boolean
formula games in general form. The problem belongs toNCwhenever the games are given in explicit form. The strong isomorphism
is given in both cases in explicit form.
Proof. Let us first assume that the games are given in general form. In this case the input is formed by two games
Γ = ⟨1n, A1, . . . , An,M1, 1t1⟩ and Γ ′ = ⟨1n, A′1, . . . , A′n,M2, 1t2⟩ and a game mapping between the two games ψ =⟨1n, A1, . . . , An, A′1, . . . , A′n, Tπ , Tϕ1 , . . . , Tϕn⟩. Then we have ⟨Γ ,Γ ′, ψ⟩ ∈ IsIso iff
∀ (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A1 × · · · × An ∀ i ∈ N u′π(i)(ψ(a1, . . . , an)) = ui(a1, . . . , an).
Therefore IsIso belongs to coNP because it is enough to guess a strategy profile a = (a1, . . . , an) and a player i, using
polynomial space, and check u′π(i)(ψ(a)) ≠ ui(a) in polynomial time.
To prove hardness we define two games, the first one is associated to a boolean formula, and a mapping between them.
Given a boolean formula F with n variables, consider the following game.
WinWhenTrue(F ): This game has n players, N = {1, . . . , n}, and player i has Ai = {0, 1}. All the players 1 ≤ i ≤ n
have the same utility ui(a1, . . . , an) = F(a1, . . . , an).
The game is coded in general form as ⟨1n, A1, . . . , An, Eval, 1log n(n+|F |)2⟩where Eval is a tm that evaluates a formula in time
O((n+ |F |)2), we provide some additional time to get rid of the constant. Observe that this codification can be obtained in
polynomial time given F .
AlwaysWin: This game has n players, N = {1, . . . , n}, and player i has Ai = {0, 1}. All the players 1 ≤ i ≤ n have the
same utility ui(a1, . . . , an) = 1.
This game can be represented in general form as ⟨1n, A1, . . . , An,One, 1n+1⟩where One is a tm that, after reading the input,
outputs 1 in time n+ 1. Furthermore the representation can be computed in O(n) time.
Identity: This mapping combines the identity function on N = {1, . . . , n}with the identity function on {0, 1}.
Themapping is represented by ⟨1n, A1, . . . , An, A1, . . . , An, idπ , id1, . . . , idn⟩, where idπ (i) = i and idi(ai) = ai for i ≤ i ≤ n.
Observe that such a representation can be obtained in time O(n).
We claim ⟨WinWhenTrue(F ),AlwaysWin, Identity⟩ ∈ IsIso iff F is valid. When F is a valid formula both games have the
same utility functions, therefore the mapping Identity is an strong isomorphism.When F is not valid there exists x1, . . . , xn
such that F(x1, . . . xn) = 0, therefore the utility of this strategy profile for player 1 in WinWhenTrue is 0, while the same
player gets utility 1 in the AlwaysWin game. Therefore, Identity is not an strong isomorphism.
When Γ1, Γ2 and ψ are formula games in general form, the same arguments shows that the IsIso problem is coNP-
complete.
When Γ1, Γ2 and ψ are given in explicit form the strong isomorphism can be verified in polylogarithmic parallel. We
have to compute in parallel for each a = (a1, . . . , an) the corresponding a′ = (a′1, . . . , a′n) such that a′Tπ [i] = Tϕi [ai] and test
if T1[a, i] = T2[a′, Tπ [i]] for each player i. 
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Our next step is to provide upper bounds for the complexity of the Iso problem.
Theorem 3. The Iso problem for strong morphism belongs to Σp2 for strategic and formula games in general form. The problem
belongs to NP when the games are given in explicit form.
Proof. Let us consider first the membership proofs. We define a nondeterministic algorithm working in polynomial
space/time depending on the representation of the input game. Assume that we are given two strategic games Γ1 =
(N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) and that Γ2 = (N, (A′i)i∈N , (u′i)i∈N), by definition, there is a strong isomorphism between Γ1 and Γ2 iff
∃ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ∀a ∈ A1 × · · · × An ∀i ∈ N ui(a) = u′π(i)(ψ(a)),
where ψ is a mapping of Γ1 to Γ2. Observe that it is possible to guess, using polynomial space, an isomorphism ψ =
⟨A1, . . . , An, A′1, . . . , A′n, Tπ , Tϕ1 , . . . , Tϕn⟩. Furthermore, given a strategy profile a = (a1, . . . , an) it is possible to compute
ψ(a) in polynomial time just doing a′Tπ [i] = Tϕi [ai]. To check the correctness of the guess, we need to verify that, for every
player i and strategy profile a, it holds ui(a) = u′π(i)(ψ(a)).
When the games are given in general form the strategy profile can be represented in polynomial space and the test
performed in polynomial time, both for utilities given by tm or formulas, therefore the Iso problem belongs to Σp2 . When
both games are given in explicit form, the number of strategy profiles is polynomial in the size of the input and therefore
we can check for all a the condition ui(a) = u′i(ψ(a)) in polynomial time once the mapping has been guessed. Therefore,
the Iso problem belongs to NP. 
In the following we prove that Iso is equivalent to CircuitIso for games in general form, and therefor it is not Σp2 -
hard unless CircuitIso is Σp2 -hard. This is done through a series of reductions transforming the game while preserving
the existence of strong isomorphism. First, we show how to construct corresponding isomorphic binary actions games.
Second, we show the construction from a binary actions game of a binary game preserving isomorphism. Finally, we show
the equivalence with the Boolean circuit congruence. All the transformations presented in the paper can be computed in
polynomial time, thus we avoid to mention this fact all through the paper. Let us start with the first transformation.
We start defining a construction for the first reduction that makes use of the binify process. Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N)
be a strategic game. In this case we get k =∑i∈N ki, were ki = |Ai|. The binify process can be used in a strategy profile, given
a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A, we write binify(a) = (binify(a1), . . . , binify(an)). Recall that good(A′) = binify(A).
BinaryAct(Γ , µ) = (N ′, (A′i)i∈N ′ , (u′i)i∈N ′) where N ′ = {1, . . . , k} and, for any i ∈ N ′, A′i = {0, 1} and thus the set of
action profiles is A′ = {0, 1}k. The players are partitioned into B1, . . . , Bn blocks. Block i is formed by ki players. Given
i ∈ Bj we say that i belongs to block j of players and write block(i) = j. The utilities are defined by
u′i(a
′) =

ublock(i)(binify−1(a′)) if a′ ∈ good(A′),
µ if a′ ∈ bad(A′).
Notice that, for a ∈ A, u′i(binify(a)) = ublock(i)(a). Furthermore, all the players in a given block have the same utility
function. Each strategy profile a′ in BinaryAct(Γ , µ) can be factorized giving the actions taken by the k players as a′ =
(a′1, . . . , a
′
k) or grouping the actions according to the blocks B1, . . . , Bn as a
′ = (b1, . . . , bn)where bi ∈ {0, 1}ki . The valueµ
will be selected to create a gap on the utility that separates the profiles in BinaryAct(Γ , µ) that codify correctly a profile of
Γ , from those that do not.
Example 4. We give an example of the transformation from Γ to BinaryAct(Γ , µ). We take as Γ a version of BS gamewith
nonzero utilities and setting µ = 0 we have:
Player 1
Player 2
1 2
1 3, 2 1, 1
2 1, 1 2, 3
BS game
A′ u1 u2 u3 u4
1010 3 3 2 2
1001 1 1 1 1
0110 2 2 3 3
0110 1 1 1 1
a′ ∈ bad(A′) 0 0 0 0
In the BS game A1 = A2 = {1, 2} and binify(1) = 10, binify(2) = 01. Therefore good(A′) = {1010, 1001, 0110, 0101} and
bad(A′) = {0, 1}4 \ good(A′). The game BinaryAct(BS, 0) has N ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The partition of players into blocks is given
by B1 = {1, 2} and B2 = {3, 4}.
Given a good strategy profile a and a player iwe compute u′i(a) as follows. Suppose a = 1010 = (binify(1), binify(1)) and
i = 4. As player 4 belongs to B2 it holds block(4) = 2 and u′4(1010) = u4(binify(1), binify(1)) = ublock(4)(1, 1) = u2(1, 1)= 2.
Now we provide the reduction from the Iso problem for strong isomorphism to the same problem for binary actions
games.
Lemma 2. Let Γ1, Γ2 be two strategic games given in general form and let t = max{t1, t2}, where ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, is the time
allowed to the utility tm of the game Γi. There is a strong isomorphism between Γ1 and Γ2 iff there is a strong isomorphism
between the games BinaryAct(Γ1, µ) and BinaryAct(Γ2, µ) where µ = −2t .
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Proof. When M is a tm computing the utilities in time t we have |ui(a)| ≤ t and −2t ≤ ui(a) ≤ 2t . Given Γ and Γ ′ with
utilities computed in times t and t ′ and taking t = max{t, t ′} and µ = −2t we can find a tm for BinaryAct(Γ , µ) and
BinaryAct(Γ ′, µ) computing utilities in O(t). Furthermore a description of both machines can be obtained in polynomial
time.
Given a strong isomorphism ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) of Γ into Γ ′, let us define a mapping ψ ′ = (p, f1, . . . , fk) of
BinaryAct(Γ , µ) into BinaryAct(Γ ′, µ). Suppose that in ψ it holds π(i) = j, then as ϕi : Ai → A′j is a bijection, by
construction blocks Bi and B′j in binary games have the same cardinality and we ask p to be a bijection p : Bi → B′j . Writing
Ai = A′j = {1, . . . , ℓ} and Bi = {i1, . . . , iℓ} and B′j = {j1 . . . , jℓ}, the action bijection ϕi(p) = q, 1 ≤ p ≤ ℓ, induces the
bijection p(ip) = jq between both blocks. This concludes the definition of p. In ψ ′ we take all the fi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k to be
identities. Let us prove that ψ ′ is a strong isomorphism. We state the proof as a sequence of claims.
ψ ′ maps any strategy profile bi for players in Bi into a strategy profile b′π(i) for players in B
′
π(i), we write ψ
′ : Bi → B′π(i) and
ψ ′(bi) = b′π(i). This is clear because p gives a bijection between Bi and B′π(i).
If |Bi| = ℓ, profile bi = 0p−110ℓ−p = binify(p) maps into ψ ′(bi) = 0q−110ℓ−q = binify(q) iff ϕi(p) = q. As all the fi’s
are identities and p is a permutation of {1, . . . , ℓ}, a binified action is mapped into a binified action. Moreover as p(ip) = jq
the 1 in position p is mapped into the 1 in position q. As ψ ′ maps strategy profiles between blocks Bi and Bπ(i), we write
ψ ′(binify(p)) = binify(ϕi(p)).
Given a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A inΓ and binify(a) = (binify(a1), . . . , binify(an)), it holds for binary actions gamesψ ′(binify(a))
= (binify(a′1), . . . , binify(a′n)) such that binify(a′π(i)) = binify(ϕi(ai)).
For any a ∈ A in Γ , it holds ψ ′(binify(a)) = binify(ψ(a)). For a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A in Γ , it holds ψ(a) = (a′1, . . . , a′n)
with a′π(i) = ϕi(ai). As binify(ψ(a)) = (binify(a′1), . . . , binify(a′n))we get binify(ψ(a)) = ψ ′(binify(a)).
For p(ip) = jq it holds u′jq(ψ ′(binify(a))) = u′ip(binify(a)). Observe that, as we have that u′jq(ψ ′(binify(a))) =
u′jq(binify(ψ(a))) = uj(ψ(a)) and u′ip(binify(a)) = ui(a) and ψ is a morphism the identity holds.
As ψ ′ maps bijectively bad strategy profiles, in this case utilities are the penalty payoff µ and ψ ′ is a morphism.
For the reverse implication, assume that ψ ′ = (p, f1, . . . , fk) is an strong isomorphism between the games
BinaryAct(Γ1, µ) and BinaryAct(Γ2, µ) having playersN ′1 andN
′
2 withN
′
1 = N ′2. The strategy profiles in both binary actions
games are A′1 and A
′
2. Now we can define a mapping (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) of Γ1 to Γ2. The permutation of players π mimics the
block permutation induced by p, thus if Bi is mapped to B′p(i) we set π(i) = p(i). The i action bijection is defined as follows.
The action j in Ai corresponds in BinaryAct(Γ1, µ) to the profile binify(j) in block Bi. As this block is mapped into B′p(i), the
profile is mapped into another good profile binify(j′) and we define ϕi(j) = j′. The mapping (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is an strong
isomorphism from Γ1 to Γ2. Again we state the proof as a sequence of claims.
ψ ′ : A′1 → A′2 induces a bijection between ψ ′ : bad(A′1) → bad(A′2). Let a′ ∈ bad(A′1) then u′i(a′) = µ, as µ is a
penalty payoff and ψ ′ is a morphism, u′p(i)(ψ(a
′)) = µ but this forces ψ(a′) ∈ bad(A′2) and ψ ′(bad(A′1)) ⊆ bad(A′2).
Given a′ ∈ bad(A′2), any player gets µ and then ψ−1(a) ∈ bad(A′1). As good(A′1) = A′1 \ bad(A′1) there is also a bijection
ψ ′ : good(A′1)→ good(A′2).
Note that N ′1 can be partitioned into the different blocks of players as N
′
1 = B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bn and N2 = B′1 ∪ · · · ∪ B′n being n the
number of players in Γ and Γ ′.
Given a block Bk in N ′1 and i, j ∈ Bk with i ≠ j, it is impossible that p(i) and p(j) belongs to different blocks of N ′2. Suppose
that Bk has ℓ players and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ. Consider the strategy profile bk = binify(i) = 0i−110j−i−100ℓ−j for block Bk. All
other blocs take the corresponding binify(1). Then a′ = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ good(A′1) and ψ ′(a′) ∈ good(A′2). Therefore we
have a factorization ψ ′(a) = (b′1, . . . , b′n) corresponding each b′i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, to a binify process. For block Bk define the
profile ck = binify(j) = 0i−100j−i−110ℓ−j and all other blocks keeps as before binify(1) then c = (c1 . . . , cn) is good, ψ(c)
is also good and factorizes as ψ(c) = (c ′1, . . . , c ′k). Let us compare ψ ′(a) = (b′1, . . . , b′n) with ψ ′(c) = (c ′1, . . . , c ′k). Let
p(i) = i′ ∈ B′k1 and p(j) = j′ ∈ B′k2 with k1 ≠ k2. In fact the bits in ψ ′(a) and ψ ′(c) coincides anywhere except in positions
corresponding to the players i′ ∈ B′k1 and j′ ∈ B′k2 . Suppose |B′k1 | = ℓ1. Consider the bijection f associated to the position i in
Bk. This bijection can be an identity or a negation. When f is the identity, the 1 appearing in position i of block bk is mapped
into the 1 in position i′ of b′k1 , as this profile is binified, we have b
′
k1
= 0i′−110ℓ1−i′ . Unfortunately the 0 appearing in position
i of ck will give c ′k1 = 0l1 turning a valid profile into an invalid profile. When f is a negation b′k1 has a 0 in position i′ and c ′k1
will have two 1’s, giving a contradiction.
Permutation p maps bijectively each block Bi into another B′j . Let k ∈ Bi and p(k) ∈ B′j then p(Bi) ⊆ B′j . Suppose that exists
l ∈ B′j \ p(Bi), then i′ = block(p−1(l)) verifies Bi ∩ Bi′ = ∅. Let f and f ′ the bijections associated to the positions k in Bi and
p−1(l) in Bi′ . Let us consider two cases depending on the size of Bi′ .
• Case |Bi′ | = 1. When f ′ is the identity, defining B′j = binify(p(k)) we force Bi′ = 0. Fulfilling all the other blocks in
BinaryAct(Γ2, µ) with binify(1) we get that ψ ′ maps a bad profile into a good one, but this is a contradiction. Consider
the case, f ′ is a negation. In this case take B′j = binify(l) and we get a similar contradiction. The same argument allow us
to assume that |Bi| > 1.• Case |Bi′ | > 1 and |Bi| > 1. When f ′ is the identity, any bijection associated to a position m in Bi is a negation. Take
Bi′ = binify(p−1(l)) and B′j = binify(l) and Bi = binify(m) as good profiles map into good profiles, the 1 in position m in
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Bi is transformed into a 0 in B′j . Therefore Bi = binify(1) = 10|Bi|−1 will give |Bi| − 1 > 0 1’s in B′j and the number of 1’s
in such a block will be at least 2. Consider the case, f ′ is a negation. As B′i has at least two positions, take a position m in
such a block such thatm ≠ p−1(l) and fix Bi = binify(m). This profile fix a 0 in position p−1(l) of Bi′ and a 1 in position l
of Bj and we apply the preceding argument.
We can assume that all the bijections f are identities. Suppose that p(Bi) = B′j . We consider three cases depending on the size
of Bi.
• Case |Bi| = 1. In this Bj′ has also 1 element. As good profiles map into good profiles, the bijection associated to this
element has to be the identity.
• Case |Bi| = 2. See in detail the different possibilities. Call Bi = {1, 2} and B′j = {1′, 2′} and call the corresponding
bijections f1 and f2. There are two possibilities for p. Consider the case p(1) = 1′ and p(2) = 2′ and look at the different
possibilities for fi.
– When f1 = f2 are identities the property holds.
– When f1 is the identity and f2 is a negation we get a contradiction because Bi = binify(2) is mapped into B′j = 00.
When f1 is a negation and f2 is the identity, the same argument applies with Bi = binify(1).
– When f1 and f2 are negations, we have to deal with care. Remark that bad profiles maps into bad profiles because 00
maps to 11 and 11maps to 00. Also good profiles maps into good profiles because 10maps to 01 and 01maps into 10.
Nothing bad happens in this case. To get identities we define another morphism ψ ′′ such that p(1) = 2′, p(2) = 1′
and f1 = f2 identities. Note that, under ψ ′′, profiles bad maps into bad profiles because 00 maps to 00 and 11 maps
into 11. Much better good profiles map in ψ ′ and in ψ ′′ in the same because 10 maps to 01 and 01 maps to 10. Note
that ψ ′′ and ψ ′ are isomorphic, therefore we can take ψ ′′ where f1 and f2 are identities.
When p(1) = 2′ and p(2) = 1′ the proof is similar to the preceding case.
• Case |Bi| > 2. If all the f ’s associated to Bi are identities the property holds, otherwise there is a position l such that fl is a
negation. As Bi = binify(l)maps to a good profile, exists l′ such that B′j = binify(l′), moreover as fl is a negation l′ ≠ p(l)
and fp−1(l′) is also a negation. As |Bi| > 2, there is a position k ∉ {l, p−1(l′)} in Bi and Bi = binify(k) give at least two 1’s
corresponding to positions l and p−1(l′), therefore we get a contradiction.
To summarize, given a strong isomorphism ψ ′ = (p, f1, . . . , fk) between the games BinaryAct(Γ1, µ) and
BinaryAct(Γ2, µ) we have that p maps bijectively blocks of players and that we can assume that all the fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
are identities.
let us consider the mapping (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) of Γ1 to Γ2. The permutation of players π mimics the block permutation
induced by p, thus if Bi is mapped to B′p(i) we set π(i) = p(i). The i action bijection is defined as follows. The action j in Ai
corresponds in BinaryAct(Γ1, µ) to the profile binify(j) in block Bi. As this block is mapped into B′p(i), the profile is mapped
into another good profile binify(j′) and we define ϕi(j) = j′. It is straightforward to show that the mapping (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)
is an strong isomorphism from Γ1 to Γ2. 
Let us now transform a binary actions game into a binary game. Given a game Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) in which
Ai = {0, 1}, for any i ∈ N , and N = {1, . . . , n}. Given positive values t and m such that, for any action profile a and
any player i, |ui(a)| ≤ t andm ≥ {n, t}. We set k = n+ tn+m+ 2 and consider the following game.
Binary(Γ , t,m) = (N ′, (A′i)i∈N ′ , (u′i)i∈N ′) where N ′ = {1, . . . , k} and, for any i ∈ N ′, A′i = {0, 1}. The set N ′ is
partitioned into n+2 consecutive intervals B0, . . . , Bn, Bn+1 so that the interval B0 has exactly n players, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
the block Bi has t players, finally block Bn+1 hasm+2 players. Inside the blocks we use relative coordinates to identify
the players. In all the blocks coordinates start at 1 except for the last block that starts with 0. In this situation a strategy
profile a is usually factorized as a = x b1 . . . bn z where x = x1 . . . xn, bi = bi1 . . . bit and z = z0 . . . zm+1. Sometimes,
to improve readability, we write a = xb1 . . . bnz as a = (x, b1, . . . , bn, z). We define the utility function by properties
of the strategy profile, assume that a = x b1 . . . bn z is a strategy profile of Binary(Γ , t,m).
• In the case that, for some ℓ, 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ m + 1, the last ℓ bits of z are 1, all the players except the last ℓ get utility 0.
The remaining players get utility 1. Observe, that in the case ℓ = 0, we have that z = 0m+2 and therefore all the
players get utility 0.
• In the case that, for some j, 1 ≤ j ≤ t , the j-th bit of z is the unique 1 in z, all the players in blocks B1, . . . , Bn that do
not occupy position j in their block get utility 0, all the players in blocks B0 and Bn+1 get utility 1, all the remaining
players get as utility their action.
• In the case that, the 0-th bit of z is the unique 1 in z, for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, player i in block B0 and all the players in
block Bi get utility 1 when ui(x) = bi and 0 otherwise. All the players in block Bn+1 get utility 0.
• In the remaining cases all the players get utility 1.
As in a strategy profile a = x b1 . . . bn z the parts x = x1 . . . xn, bi = bi1 . . . bit and z = z0 . . . zm+1 are binary words,
the whole profile a is also a binary string having length k = n + tn + m + 2. As the utilities for all the players are
either 0 or 1, we all the utilities together as a binary string u(a) = u1 . . . uk.
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Example 5. We continue with the game used in Example 4. Consider the game Γ = BinaryAct(BS, 0) where actions are
binary but utilities are not. The values of the utilities are 1, 2 and 3 obtained from the utilities in BS and 0 corresponding the
utility of any bad profile. As expressed in binary the utilities are 00, 01, 10 and 11, two bits suffices. The game Γ has n = 4.
Therefore we can take t = 2 andm = 4. The game Binary(Γ , 2, 4) has k = n+ tn+m+ 2 = 18 players.
The set N ′ is partitioned into 6 blocks. The block B0 contains 4 players, each Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 has 2 players and B5 has 6
players. A strategy profile has the format a = xb1 . . . b4z with x = x1 . . . x4, bi = bi1bi2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 and z = z0z1 . . . z4z5.
The utilities are coded u(a) = u1 . . . u18. Let us consider examples of utilities in each of the preceding four cases.
• Take for instance ℓ = 3, then a = xb1 . . . b40313 and u(a) = 01513. We can display the block structure of the preceding
utility as
u(a) = 0 . . . 0  
B0
0 . . . . . . 0  
B1,...,B4
000
ℓ
111  
B5
When ℓ = 0 we have profiles like a = xb1 . . . b406. In this case all the players get utility 0.• When z = z0z1z2z3z4z5 = 001000, the profile z ‘‘looks at’’ the second bit of each bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. In this case
u(a) = 1 . . . 1  
B0
0b120b220b320b42  
B1,...,B4
1 . . . 1  
B5
When z = 000010, the profile z points to ‘‘out of range’’ position in blocks bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. In this case
u(a) = 1 . . . 1  
B0
0 . . . . . . 0  
B1,...,B4
1 . . . 1  
B5
• The connections between strategy profiles and utilities appears when z = 100000. Remind that in the game Γ =
BinaryAct(BS, 0) it holds
u1(1010) = u2(1010) = 11, u3(1010) = u4(1010) = 10.
Let us consider profiles starting and ending as a = (1010, b1, . . . , b4, 100000). Consider for instance a = (1010, 10, 11,
00, 10, 100000). As b1 = 10 ≠ u1(1010), player 1 and players in block B1 gets utility 0. As b2 = 11 = u2(1010), player 2
and players in block B2 get 1 utility. Following this argument
u(a) = 0101
B0
00
B1
11
B2
00
B3
11
B4
000000  
B6
• In all the remaining cases, all the players get utility 1.
Lemma 3. Let Γ1, Γ2 be two binary actions games given in general form, set t = max{t1, t2, 3}, where ti is the time allowed to
the utility tm of game Γi, and m = max{t, n1, n2}, where ni is the number of players in game Γi. There is a strong isomorphism
between Γ1 and Γ2 iff there is a strong isomorphism between Binary(Γ1, t,m) and Binary(Γ2, t,m).
Proof. Given a mapping ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) of Γ1 into Γ2, consider the mapping ψ ′ = (p, f1, . . . , fk) of Binary(Γ1, t,m)
into Binary(Γ2, t,m) in which, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, fi = ϕi, and, for any i > n, fi is the identity. The permutation p on B1,0
is exactly π . For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, block B1,i is mapped to block B2,π(i) and block B1,n+1 is mapped to block B2,n+1. Inside each
block the players are assigned preserving the relative order of positions in the block. It is straightforward to show that if ψ
is an isomorphism then ψ ′ is also an isomorphism.
For the reverse implication, assume that ψ ′ = (p, f1, . . . , fk) is a strong isomorphism between the games
Binary(Γ1, t,m) and Binary(Γ2, t,m). Observe that in such a case Γ1 and Γ2 have the same number n of players. In this
case we can show that permutation p preserves blocks, and relative positions inside interior blocks, therefore we can define
a mapping ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) in which π is the restriction of p to block B1,0 and, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ϕi = fi. Let
a = x b1 . . . bn z be a strategy profile for Binary(Γ1, t,m), where x = x1 . . . xn, bi = bi1 . . . bit and z = z0 . . . zm+1 are binary
words.
We represent the utilities of a as a binary string u(a) = u1, . . . , un+tn+m+2, when we speak in general about a property
of the construction we will not use subindices, however we will use u1(a) and u2(ψ(a)) to denote vector utilities for the
first or second game. As usual, for a binary stringw we use |w|1 to denote the number of 1’s present inw. Observe that, for
a strategy profile a, |u1(a)|1 = |u2(ψ(a))|1. According with the definition of utilities for Binary(Γ , t,m) we have that, for
any profile a,
1. if z = 0m+2−ℓ1ℓ, then |u(a)|1 = ℓ, and at least one player in the block Bn+1 gets utility 1.
2. if z = 00j−110m+1−j, for some 1 ≤ j < t , then n+m+ 2 ≤ |u(a)|1 ≤ n+ t +m+ 2 and all the players in the block Bn+1
get utility 1.
3. if z = 10m+1, then |u(a)|1 is a multiple of t + 1 and all the players in the block Bn+1 get utility 0.
4. In the remaining cases, |u(a)|1 = n+ tn+m+ 2.
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The permutation p maps the block n + 1 of Γ1 to the block n + 1 of Γ2, furthermore the restriction of p to B1,n+1 is the
identity and, for any j ∈ B1,n+1, fj is the identity. The claim follows from condition 1, as this is needed to guarantee that, when
z = 0m+2−ℓ1ℓ, |u1(a)|1 = |u2(ψ(a)|1.
Let bit(j) be the set of players that appear at the j− th position in some block B1, . . . , Bn.
For any 1 ≤ j ≤ t, the permutation p maps bit1(j) to bit2(j). Furthermore for any i ∈ bit1(j), fi is the identity. The rigidity of
ψ on block B1,n+1 forces that the profile a in which all the player i ∈ bit1(j) select action 1 and z = 00j−110m+1−j, creates
an utility string with exactly 2n + m ones, therefore the unique possibility for ψ to remain as an isomorphism is the one
expressed in the claim.
As a consequence of the previous claims we have that the permutation pmaps the players in block B1,0 to block B2,0.
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the permutation p maps the block B1,i to the block B2,p(i). Furthermore, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the player in the
j− th position of B1,i is mapped by ψ to the j− th position of B2,p(i). Consider the profile a in which z = 10m+1, and x verifies
that, bi = ui(x) and, for any ℓ ≠ i, bℓ ≠ uℓ(x). The rigidity of ψ on block B1,n+1 forces that in |u1(a)| = t + 1. In u2(ψ(a))
we know that the utility for player p(i) has to be one and therefore all the utilities of all the players in B2,p(i) must be one.
Again the unique possibility is the one expressed in the first part of claim. The second part follows as a consequence of the
first part and the previous claim.
Putting all together, we can define a morphism ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) in which π is the restriction of p to block B1,0 and,
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ϕi = fi. Consider the profile a in which z = 10m+1, and x verifies that, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, verifies
b1,i = ui(x), then u1(a) has a 1 in all positions except the last m + 2 that hold a 0. Furthermore, ψ(a) = π(x)b2,1 . . . b2,nz
and, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if b2,π(i) = b1,i. Therefore, we have that, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, u1(x) = u2(ψ(x)), therefore ψ is an
isomorphism. 
Given a binary game Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) with n players, such that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, utility ui has range {0, 1}
and Ai = {0, 1}. We construct a circuit CΓ on 4n + 2 variables. Recall that, when ui(x) is computed by a Turing machine in
polynomial time, Ladner’s construction [22] gives us a polynomial size circuit computing the same function.
Circuit CΓ . The variables in CΓ are grouped in four blocks, the X-block contains the first n-variables, the Y -block is
formed by the variables in positions n + 1 to 2n, the C-block contain the following n + 2 variables, and the D-block
the remaining variables. For sake of readability we split the set of variables into four parts a = (x, y, c, d) where
x = (x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn), c = (c1, . . . cn+2), and d = (d1, . . . , dn).
We define CΓ with the help of n+ 2 following circuits.
C1(x, y, d) = [(x1 = d1) ∧ · · · ∧ (xn = dn) ∧ (u1(x) = y1) ∧ · · · ∧ (un(x) = yn)]
C2(y) = [y1 ∨ · · · ∨ yn]
Ci+2(xi, yi, di) = [yi ∧ (xi = di)] for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Finally
CΓ (x, y, c, d) =

0 if
−
1≤i≤n+2
ci = 0 or
−
1≤i≤n+2
ci > 1
Cj if
−
1≤i≤n+2
ci = 1 and cj = 1.
The previous construction is used to reduce the Iso problem to the CircuitCong problem.
Lemma 4. Let Γ and Γ ′ be two binary games in general form with at least two players each. There is a congruence isomorphism
between CΓ and CΓ ′ iff there is a strong isomorphism between Γ and Γ ′.
Proof. Assume that ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is a strong isomorphism from Γ to Γ ′ and consider the following variable
transformation. The transformation preserves blocks. Variable xi is mapped to variable x′π(i) with permutation ϕi, the same
happens with block D. Variables yi is mapped to variable y′π(i) with permutation the identity function, variable c1 is mapped
to variable c ′1, c2 to c
′
2, and c2+i to c
′
2+π(i) all the block c with permutation the identity function.
For the reverse implication, let ψ ′ = (p, f1, . . . , f4n+2) be a congruence morphism between CΓ and CΓ ′ . Given a =
(a1, . . . , a4n+2), for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4n+2 the value p(i)points to the image of ai.Whenψ(a) = (a′1, . . . , a′4n+2) it holds a′p(i) = f (ai).
When a = (x, y, c, d), to avoid confusionswe note p(xi) the position of the image of xi andwe take similar conventions for
p(yi), p(ci) and p(di). Similarly the value of the image of xi will be f (xi). The congruence verifies that for any truth assignment
a to the variables of CΓ , we have that CΓ (a) = CΓ ′(ψ ′(a)). Congruence Ψ ′ allows us to prove thatψ preserves the structure
of the C and Y blocks as follows.
The values of the variables c1, . . . , cn+2 are used to activate the different circuits C1, . . . , Cn+2 that form CΓ . Each of those
circuits has different properties. As before we state the proof as a series of claims.
Permutation p maps the variables in the C-block of CΓ to the C-block of CΓ ′ . Assume for contradiction that there are k ≥ 1
variablesmapped from outside the C-block of CΓ to the C-block of CΓ ′ . Let us see that we can force an assignment a in which
there is only one 1 in position 2 of the C-block for which CΓ (a) is true, while in ψ ′(a) there are at least two 1’s, and that is
impossible. Consider in detail the case k = 1. As in a = (a1, . . . , a4n+2) one position leaves the block C , there is ai in blocks
X , Y or D entering the block C ′ in ψ ′(a) and c ′p(i) = f (ai). We have to consider two cases based on p(c2).
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• Case p(c2) is a position in C ′. In this case c ′p(c2) = f (c2). When the bijection f is the identity, c ′p(c2) = c2, we have to
consider the different possible origins of ai.
– When ai is located in X we have ai = xi. Fix xi ∈ {0, 1} to the value such that f (xi) = 1. Consider a = (x, y, c, d)
such that x = 0i−1xi0n−i, y = 10n, c = 010n and d = 0n. It holds CΓ (a) = C2(a) = 1 but CΓ ′(ψ(a)) = 0 because C ′
contains at least two ones in c ′p(i) and c
′
p(c2)
.
– When ai is located in D we have ai = dj, for j = i− 3n+ 2. Fix dj ∈ {0, 1} to the value such that f (dj) = 1. Consider
a = (x, y, c, d) such that x = 0n, y = 10n, c = 010n and d = 0j−1dj0n−j. Again, it holds that CΓ (a) = C2(a) = 1 but
CΓ ′(ψ(a)) = 0.
– When ai is located in Y it holds yi−n = ai. Fix the value of yi−n such that f (yi−n) = 1. As the Y block has at
least two positions, there is j such that j ≠ i− n and we can fix yj = 1. Then a = (x, y, c, d) with x = 0n,
y = 0 . . . 0yi−n0 . . . 0yj0 . . . 0 (case i−n ≥ j, other cases are similar) c = 010n and d = 0n verifies CΓ (a) ≠ CΓ ′(ψ(a)).
Now we have to consider what happens when f is a negation, c ′p(c2) = ¬c2. As just one position in C is mapped out C ′,
exists j such that p(cj) is not a position in C ′, therefore cj ≠ c2. Taking C also as a set, we have that for any ck ∈ C \ {c2, cj}
it holds that p(ck) is located in C ′. We consider two cases
– For all ck ∈ C \ {c2, cj} it holds that f (ck) is the identity, c ′p(ck) = ck. We can force the value c ′p(j) to be 0, therefore for
C = 010n we get C ′ = 0n+2. As we can choose the block Y having at least one 1 we can easily build a profile a such
that CΓ (a) ≠ CΓ ′(ψ(a)).
– Exists ck ∈ C \ {c2, cj} such that f (ck) is a negation, c ′p(ck) = ¬ck. Fixing C = 010n we get ck = 1. Forcing c ′p(i) to be 1,
the block C ′ will have at least two 1. As Y has at least two positions, we can easily build a not fulfilling the congruence.
• Case p(c2) is a position in X ′, Y ′ or D′. Intuitively c2 leaves the C block and we have to look at the elements ck ∈ C \ {c2}.
We consider two cases.
– For any ck ∈ C \ {c2}, the bijection f (ck) is the identity. Fixing c ′p(i) to be 0 and C = 010n we have C ′ = 0n+2 and we
can build a not fulfilling the congruence.
– Exists ck ∈ C \ {c2} such that f (ck) is a negation. Fixing c ′p(i) to be 1 and C = 010n we have that C ′ has at least two 1
and we can build a not fulfilling the congruence.
This concludes analysis of the impossibility when k = 1. When k > 1 the analysis follows the same ideas.
All the functions associated to variables in the C-block are the identity. If there are more than two negations, ψ ′ transform
an input with exactly one 1 in block C to a situation with two 1’s in block C . If there is one negation, the situation in which
all the bits in C are set to 0, is transformed into another one in which there is only one 1.
We have p(c1) = c ′1 and p(c2) = c ′2. Let us consider the possible misplacements for p(c1). We have two cases
• The index p(c1) = ci is located in one of the last n positions of C ′. Then C = 10n+1 is mapped into C ′ = 0i−110n+2−i and
the activated circuits are CΓ = C1 and CΓ ′ = Ci. Fix x′i−2 = y′i−2 = 0 and d′i−2 = 1 and CΓ ′ = 1. As p maps C into C ′ it
also maps X ∪ Y ∪ D bijectively into X ′ ∪ Y ′ ∪ D′. As |X | + |D| ≥ 4 and x′i−2 y′i−2 d′i−2 are fixed, only three antiimages
have been fixed and there is at least a ‘‘free’’ position in the X ∪ D blocks. Suppose that xj is the free position (the case dj
is similar) and look at the corresponding dj. If dj is fixed take xj = dj, if dj is free define dj = xj = 1. In both cases C1 = 0.
• The index p(c1) points to c ′2, that is c2 = c1. The block C = 10n+1 is mapped to 010n and under this situation CΓ = C1 and
CΓ ′ = C2. Fix an arbitrary bit y′i in Y ′ and look at the possible antiimage of y′i . In the bijection p : X ∪Y ∪D → X ′∪Y ′∪D′
only the antiimage of y′i fixed. Suppose that the antiimage is one is an xj, then fix dj = xj. When the antiimage belongs
to Y , choose one xk and fix it and the corresponding dk to 1. When the antiimage is dj fix xj to the same value. In all the
cases C1 = 0.
We have proved p(c1) = c ′1. To prove p(c2) = c ′2 follow the same ideas.
Permutation p maps the variables in the Y-block of CΓ to the Y-block of CΓ ′ . Furthermore, the functions associated to the
variables in the Y-block are the identity. This is a consequence of the rigidity of ψ ′ on c2 and the definition of the formula C2.
Furthermore the functions fi, for i in block C or Y , is the identity. This allows us to consider the permutation π on
{1, . . . , n} such that p(ci+2) = c ′π(i)+2. Moreover we can prove that this permutation verifies p(xi) = x′π(i) iff p(di) = d′π(i)
and p(xi) = d′π(i) iff p(di) = x′π(i). Consider π to be the permutation on {1, . . . , n} such that p(ci+2) = c ′π(i)+2.
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, positions i in blocks X, Y and D of CΓ are mapped to positions π(i) of blocks X, Y and D of C ′Γ . Furthermore,
p(yi) = y′π(i). This result is insured by the definition of the n formulas Ci+2, as each of them forces to combine the input bits
xi and yi with di. The last part follows taking into account that the Y -block of CΓ is mapped to the Y -block of CΓ ′ .
The above result implies that, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 1, either p(xi) = xπ(i) or p(xi) = dπ(i). Furthermore, the permutation
associated to xi and di must be the same,
p(xi) = x′π(i) iff p(di) = d′π(i) and p(xi) = d′π(i) iff p(di) = x′π(i),
otherwise, we can find an input for which Ci+2(xi, yi, di) = 1 while we also have Cπ(i)+2(ψ ′(xi, yi, di)) = 0.
Consider the mapping ψ ′′ = (p′, f ′1, . . . , f ′4n+2) such that the behavior of the permutation and bijections coincides with
ψ ′ in blocks Y and C . In blocks X and D is given by
p′(xi) =

x′π(i) if p(xi) = x′π(i)
x′π(i) if p(xi) = d′π(i) and p
′(di) =

d′π(i) if p(di) = d′π(i)
d′π(i) if p(di) = x′π(i)
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then p′ : X → X ′ and p′ : D → D′ and the behavior of p′ is the same in both blocks, that is p′(xi) = x′π(i) iff p′(di) = d′π(i).
The bijections are defined as
f ′(xi) =

f (xi) if p(xi) = x′π(i)¬f (xi) if p(xi) = d′π(i) and f
′(di) =

f (di) if p(di) = d′π(i)¬f (di) if p(di) = x′π(i).
The morphism ψ ′′ is a congruence. This trivially happens because for any strategy profile a it holds ψ ′(a) = ψ ′′(a).
Finally, it is easy to prove that the morphism ψ given by ψ = (π, f ′1, . . . , f ′n) is an isomorphism between Γ and Γ ′. 
It is easy to show that CircuitCong is reducible to Iso, just consider a gamewith asmany players as variables inwhich the
utilities for all the players are identical and coincide with the evaluation of the circuit. Taking into account that CircuitCong
is equivalent to CircuitIso putting all together we have:
Theorem 4. The strong isomorphism problem for strategic games in general form is polynomially equivalent to the circuit
isomorphism problem.
Observe that, for games in general form, the Iso problem for strong isomorphism remains equivalent to the Iso problem
for strong isomorphismwhen the games are restricted to be binary actions or binary games, as the identity trivially reduces
the latest problem to the former one.
We consider now formula games in general form, the results also apply to WBFG games [13] where actions are given in
explicit way. The proof follows the same steps as for the previous case. Nowwe have to show that a description of the games
provided in the reduction as formula games can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 5. The strong isomorphism problem for formula games andWBFG in general form are equivalent to the boolean formula
isomorphism problem.
Proof. The game BinaryAct(Γ , µ)when Γ is a formula game in general form is a formula game. The game Binary(Γ , t,m)
when Γ is a binary actions formula game in general form is a formula game. A description in general form of the games
BinaryAct(Γ , µ) and Binary(Γ , t,m) can be computed in polynomial time. Furthermore, a description of the circuit CΓ ,
for a binary formula game Γ , can be obtained in polynomial time.We show first that the game BinaryAct(Γ , µ), for a given
formula game in general form Γ = ⟨1n, A1, . . . , An, 1ℓ, (ϕi,j)1≤i≤n,0≤j<ℓ⟩, as defined in Section 3, is a formula game whose
description can be computed in polynomial time.
Recall that the utility functions of BinaryAct(Γ , µ) are defined as follows:
u′i(a
′) =

ublock(i)(binify−1(a′)) if a′ ∈ good(A′),
µ if a′ ∈ bad(A′).
Where good(A′) = {binify(a)|a ∈ A} and binify(j) = 0j−110ki−j. Observe that to compute the utilities we will need to show
that the function binify−1 can be represented by boolean formula as well as the property a′ ∈ good(A′). For doing so, we
show that they can be computed inNC1, and use the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 1 to construct the formulas.
For a′ ∈ good(A′) it must happen that the sumof all its bits is one. And of course this can be computed inNC1. To compute
binify−1(a′) for some a′ ∈ good(A′), let us assume that a′ = 0j−110ki−j. We compute the suffix sum of the bits of a′, thus
getting b = 1j0ki−j. Then j is the sum of the bits of b.
Finally, using the formula for a′ ∈ good(A′) and the ones that compute the bits of binify−1(a′), combined with the fact
that µ is a constant, and the formulas describing the utilities of the player’s in Γ , we can construct the set of formulas that
describe the utilities for BinaryAct(Γ , µ) in polynomial time. Therefore, we have that the Iso problem for formula games in
general form is equivalent to the Iso problem for formula games in general formwith binary actions, according to Lemma 2.
Now we show that given Γ = ⟨1n, A1, . . . , An, 1ℓ, (ϕi,j)1≤i≤n,0≤j<ℓ⟩, a formula game in general form with binary actions,
the game Binary(Γ , t,m), as defined in Section 3, is a formula game whose description can be computed in polynomial
time.
Recall that Binary(Γ , t,m) is the game (N ′, (A′i)i∈N ′ , (u
′
i)i∈N ′) where N ′ = {1, . . . , k} and, for any i ∈ N ′, A′i = {0, 1}
where k = n + tn + m + 2. The set N ′ is partitioned into n + 2 consecutive intervals B0, . . . , Bn, Bn+1 so that the interval
B0 has exactly n players, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the block Bi has t players, finally block Bn+1 has m + 2 players. As before a strategy
profile a is usually factorized as a = x b1 . . . bn z where now x = x1 . . . xn, bi = biℓ−1 . . . bi0 and z = z0 . . . zm+1. Observe that
if the formula game uses ℓ formulas per player then t = ℓ+ 1.
To express the utilities by a boolean formula, we consider the following auxiliary formulas, for z = z0, . . . , zm+1:
fromi(z) =

i−1
j=0
¬zj

∧

m+1
j=i
zj

for 0 ≤ i ≤ m+ 1
onlyi(z) =

i−1
j=0
¬zj

∧ zi ∧

m+1
j=i+1
¬zj

for 0 ≤ i ≤ m+ 1.
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The previous formulas allow us to express the different conditions considered in the definition of the game Binary(Γ , t,m).
one(z) =
m+1
i=0
fromi(z)
two(z) =
t
i=1
onlyi(z)
three(z) = only0(z)
four(z) = ¬(one(z) ∨ two(z) ∨ three(z)).
Note that, predicates one, two, two, four give us a partition of the strategy profiles. Recall that the utility of player i in Γ is
given by the equation ui(a1, . . . , an) =∑0≤j<ℓ ϕi,j(a1, . . . , an)2j. We also consider the formula
equti(x, bi) =
ℓ
j=0
(ϕij(x) ∧ bij) ∨ (¬ϕij(x) ∧ ¬bij),
which express the fact that bi is the utility of player i in game Γ .
Now we provide a formula for each ‘‘type of player’’ that allows to compute their utility in game Binary(Γ , t,m).
• Utility for player α in position β of block j (1 ≤ j ≤ n). The formula is expressed as disjunction of the four cases.
– When one(z) holds, the utility is 0. This give us a term one(z) ∧ 0 equivalent to 0.
– When two(z) holds there are two cases.When onlyβ(z) holds, the position of the player α inside the block j coincides
with the position of the 1 in z and then the utility is bjβ . When onlyβ(z) is false the utility is 0. Therefore this part
contributes with a term two(z) ∧ onlyβ(z) ∧ bjβ .
– When three(z) holds, all the players is block j have the same boolean utility defined as the value of the expression
(uj(x) = bj). This part is encoded as three(z) ∧ equtj(x, bj).
– When four(z) holds, the value of the utility is 1, therefore we have a term four(z) ∧ 1.
Using basic properties of boolean functions we obtain
Ψα(a) = (two(z) ∧ onlyβ(z) ∧ bjβ ) ∨ (three(z) ∧ equtj(x, bj)) ∨ four(z).
• Utility for player α in position β of block 0
Ψα(a) = two(z) ∨ (three(z) ∧ equtβ(x, bβ)) ∨ four(z).
• Utility for player α in position β of block n+ 1
Ψα(a) = (one(z) ∧ fromβ(z)) ∨ two(z) ∨ four(z).
It is straightforward to show that the previous formulas can bewritten in polynomial time. Thus using Lemma 3, we have
that the Iso problem for formula games in general form is equivalent to the Iso problem for binary formula games.
The last step is to show that given a binary formula gameΓ the boolean circuit CΓ as defined in Section 3 can be described
by a formula. From the definition of CΓ it follows trivially that Ck (1 ≤ k ≤ n+ 2) can be described by formulas as the utility
for the player are given by a formula. Consider the formulas:
onlyi(c1, . . . , cn+2) = ¬c1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ci−1 ∧ ci ∧ ¬ci+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬cn+2, 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 2
exone(c1, . . . , cn+2) = c1 ∨ · · · ∨ cn+2
moreone(c1, . . . , cn+2) =

1≤i<j≤n+2
(ci ∧ cj).
Then CΓ can be expressed as a disjunctions of the three cases. When ¬exone(c) or moreone(c) holds the result is 0,
otherwise the value is computed by a disjunction of terms onlyj(c) ∧ Cj(a). Therefore CΓ is expressed as
n+2
j=1
onlyj(c) ∧ Cj(a).
It is straightforward to show that a description of the previous circuit can be computed in polynomial time. Thus using
Lemma 4, we have that the Iso problem for formula games in general form is equivalent to the FormulaIso problem. 
Proving NP-completeness in the case of explicit form appears to be a difficult task. Observe, that a game in explicit form
can be seen as a graph with edge labels and weights. The isomorphism problem for weighted graphs in which the total
number of different weights is polynomially reducible to the Graph isomorphism problem [27]. Therefore the NP-hardness
of Iso will imply the NP-hardness of GI. We have to prove the opposite direction. We start by constructing a game from a
graph.
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Given an undirected graph G, let us define a strategic game Γ (G) associated to this graph.
Game Γ (G). Assume that G = (V , E) is an undirected graph with V = {1, . . . , n} and m edges. Given e ∈ E we write e = {i, j}
to denote an edge connecting i and j. The game has 4 players with A1 = A2 = {0, 1, . . . , n}, A3 = {0, 1}, A4 = E ∪ {0}. Let
A = A1 × A2 × A3 × A4 and (i, j, k, l) ∈ A, the utilities are:
u1(i, j, k, l) = u2(i, j, k, l) =

1 if l = {i, j} and k = 0,
0 otherwise
u3(i, j, k, l) =

1 if i = 0, j ≠ 0, k = 1 and l ≠ 0,
0 otherwise
u4(i, j, k, l) =

1 if i = j = k = 0,
0 otherwise.
Observe that the graph isomorphism problem is equivalent to the problem restricted to connected graphs G and G′ that have
n > 2 vertices. Otherwise, we add one after another new vertices connected to all the other vertices in the graph (in both
graphs) until the condition is fulfilled. This type of vertex addition preserves isomorphism. With this construction we can
also assume that, any vertex has at least one outgoing edge.
Lemma 5. Let G, G′ two connected undirected graphs, with at least two vertices. The games Γ (G) and Γ (G′) are strongly
isomorphic iff G and G′ are isomorphic.
Proof. Assume that p is an isomorphism between graphs G and G′. Let ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . ϕ4) be a game mapping defined as
follows π and ϕ3 are the identity, ϕ1 = ϕ2 = p, ϕ4(0) = 0 and, for any edge {u, v} ∈ E(G), ϕ4({u, v}) = {p(u), p(v)}. It is
straightforward to show that ψ is a strong isomorphism between Γ (G) and Γ (G′).
Let ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . ϕ4) be a strong isomorphism between Γ (G) and Γ (G′), this verifies the following.
The player’s permutation verifies π : {1, 2} → {1, 2}, π : {3} → {3} and finally π : {4} → {4}. Denoting by # the
cardinality of a set, we have #{a|u1(a) = 1} = #{a|u2(a) = 1} = 2m, #{a|u3(a) = 1} = mn and #{a|u4(a) = 1} = m+ 1.
When n > 2 and m > 2, these sets have different cardinality. As #{a|ui(a) = 1} = #{ψ(a)|u′π(i)(ψ(a)) = 1}, we get the
result.
As players 1 and 2 have the same behavior we can assume π(1) = 1 and π(2) = 2, therefore π is the identity.
The action’s bijection ϕ3 is the identity. As π is the identity, it holds the following bijection ψ(A1 × A2 × {0} × A4) =
A′1 × A′2 × {1} × A′4. Therefore, for any i′, j′, l′ holds u′3(i′, j′, 1, l′) = 0 because u3(ϕ−11 (i′), ϕ−12 (j′), 0, ϕ−14 (l′)) = 0. This is a
contradiction because u′3(i′, 0, 1, e′) = 1 when 1 ≤ i ≤ n and e′ ∈ E ′.
The action’s bijections for players 1 and 2 verify ϕ1(0) = 0 and ϕ2(0) = 0. This is forced by the rigid the structure of u4. As
u4(0, 0, 0, l) = 1 we should have u′4(ϕ1(0), ϕ2(0), 0, ϕ1(l)) = 1 and this force ϕ1(0) = ϕ2(0) = 0. Therefore ϕ1 and ϕ2 are
permutations on vertices {1, . . . , n}.
The action’s bijection ϕ4 verifies ϕ4(0) = 0.When this does not hold, as ϕ4 is a bijection, there exists e such that ϕ4(e) = 0.
For j ≠ 0 it holds that u3(0, j, 1, e) = 1 and, asψ is a morphism, u′3(0, ϕ2(j), 1, 0) = 1, but this is a contradiction. Therefore
ϕ4 is a permutation on them edges.
When ϕ4(e) = e′ and e = {i, j} it holds that e′ = {ϕ1(i), ϕ2(j)}. As u1(i, j, 0, {i, j}) = 1 and ψ is a morphism,
u′1(ϕ1(i), ϕ2(j), 0, ϕ4({i, j})) = 1, and ϕ4({i, j})) = {ϕ1(i), ϕ2(j)}.
ϕ1 and ϕ2 are the same permutation on {1, . . . , n}. We have to prove that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} it hold ϕ1(i) = ϕ2(i). Let i
be a vertex, as every node has positive degree, exits j such that e = {i, j} is an edge in G. As u1(i, j, 0, e) = u1(j, i, 0, e) = 1
it holds ϕ4(e) = {ϕ1(i), ϕ2(j)} = {ϕ1(j), ϕ2(i)}. There are two possibilities, ϕ1(i) = ϕ2(i) and ϕ1(j) = ϕ2(j) or ϕ1(i) = ϕ1(j)
and ϕ2(j) = ϕ2(i). But ϕ1(i) = ϕ1(j) is impossible because ϕ1 is a permutation.
When ψ is an isomorphism, the mapping ϕ1 : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} induces a graph isomorphism. Consider and edge
e = {i, j} in G as ψ is a game morphism u1(i, j, 0, e) = u′1(ϕ1(i), ϕ1(j), 0, ϕ4(e)) and this forces ϕ4(e) = {ϕ1(i), ϕ1(j)}. 
As a consequence of the previous results we get the following.
Theorem 6. The strong isomorphism problem for games given in explicit form is equivalent to the graph isomorphism problem.
4. Weak isomorphisms
Replacing strong by weak isomorphisms does not modify complexity bounds. In this section we show that, for the case
of weak isomorphism, the IsIso problem is coNP-complete and that the Iso problem is equivalent to the Iso problem for
strong isomorphisms. The last equivalence will hold for any of the considered representations of the games.
Theorem 7. The IsIso problem for weak isomorphism is coNP-complete, for games given in general form (strategic, formula and
WBFG), and it belongs toNCwhen the games are given in explicit form. The Iso problem belongs toΣp2 , when the games are given
in general form (strategic, formula and WBFG) and it belongs to NP when the games are given in explicit form.
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Proof. We adapt the proofs given in Theorems 2 and 3. Membership in coNP of the IsIso problem for weak isomorphism
and for games given in explicit or general form follows from the definitions.
When the games and the morphism are given in explicit form, a direct adaptation of the proof given in Theorem 2 give
us that IsIso belongs to NC for weak isomorphism.
To prove hardness, given a boolean formula F with n variables, we define a variation of the game WinWhenTrue(F),
WinWhenTrueW(F) in which we redefine utilities as follows:
ui(a1, . . . , an) =

2n if F(a1, . . . , an) is true,
n−
i=1
ai2n−i if F(a1, . . . , an) is false.
Observe that for any pair of strategy profiles a ≠ a′, a ∼i a′ holds when both F(a) = F(a′) = 1. When F(a) = F(a′) = 0,
a ≺i a′ if and only if a < a′ in lexicographic order. When F(a) ≠ F(a′) player i prefers the satisfying assignment. On the
other hand we consider the AlwaysWin game in which a ∼i a′ always holds.
Observe that the Identitymorphism is a weak isomorphism between the games AlwaysWin andWinWhenTrueW(F)
iff F is valid. Thus, the IsIso problem for weak isomorphism and games in general form is coNP-complete.
Finally observe that a description in general form of the WinWhenTrueW(F) and the AlwaysWin games can be
computed in polynomial time, both when the utility functions are described by Turing machines or by formulas. 
When considering the weak isomorphism we will show that the Iso problem, for strategic games in general form, is
equivalent to the boolean circuit isomorphisms, for formula games in general form to the boolean formula isomorphism,
and for strategic games in explicit form to the graph isomorphism problem. Before proving those results we provide a series
of game transformations that preserve weak isomorphism establishing equivalence with the strong isomorphism. Later on
we will show that those transformations are indeed polynomial time reduction for the considered representations.
Assume that Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) is a binary game where N = {1, . . . , n}. We consider the following game.
CheckW(Γ ) = (N ′, (A′i)i∈N ′ , (u′i)i∈N ′) where N ′ = {1, . . . , n, n + 1} and, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, A′i = {0, 1} and
A′n+1 = {0, 1, 2, 3}. The utilities are defined as follows, for a player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
u′i(a
′) =

1 if ui(a′1, . . . , a′n) = (a′n+1 mod 2),
0 otherwise.
For the last player,
u′n+1(a
′) = a′n+1.
We can look at the equality

ui(a′1, . . . , a′n) = (a′n+1 mod 2)

as a boolean expression taking values {0, 1}, under this point
of view we write shortly u′i(a′) =

ui(a′1, . . . , a′n) = (a′n+1 mod 2)

.
Also note that Γ is a binary game (both, actions and utilities are binary), CheckW(Γ ) is not a binary game either a binary
actions game due to the last player. Player n+ 1 in CheckW(Γ ) has four actions and un+1 takes four values.
Lemma 6. Let Γ1 and Γ2 be two binary games. Γ1 and Γ2 are strongly isomorphic iff the games CheckW(Γ1) and CheckW(Γ2)
are weakly isomorphic.
Proof. Let Γ ′1 = CheckW(Γ1) and Γ ′2 = CheckW(Γ2). Assume that ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is a strong isomorphism between
Γ1 and Γ2. Define the mapping ψ ′ = (p, f1, . . . , fn+1) where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, p(i) = π(i) and fi = ϕi, p(n + 1) = n + 1 and
fn+1 is the identity function. Let us prove that ψ ′ is a strong (therefore also a weak) isomorphism between Γ ′1 and Γ
′
2 .
Let a′ = (a1, . . . , an, an+1) be a strategy profile in CheckW(Γ1) we write a′ = (a, an+1) with a = (a1, . . . , an). By the
definition of ψ ′ it hods ψ ′(a′) = (ψ(a), an+1) because fn+1(an+1) = an+1. Let us prove that ψ ′ is strong isomorphism. Note
that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as ψ is a strong isomorphism, uπ(i)(ψ(a)) = ui(a) and therefore
u′p(i)(ψ
′(a′)) = uπ(i)(ψ(a)) = (a′n+1 mod 2) = ui(a) = (a′n+1 mod 2) = u′i(a′).
It remains the case n+ 1. As p(n+ 1) = n+ 1 and fn+1 is the identity u′n+1(ψ ′(a)) = a′n+1 = un+1(a).
Assume now that ψ ′ = (p, f1, . . . , fn+1) is a weak isomorphism between Γ ′1 and Γ ′2 . As p maps between them players
having the same number of actions, and the only player with 4 actions is the last one we are forced to have p(n+1) = n+1.
Let ψ be ψ ′ restricted to players 1, . . . , n, that is ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, π(i) = p(i) and ϕi = fi.
For any a′ = (a, a′n+1) with a = (a1, . . . , an) we have that ψ ′(a′) =

ψ(a), fn+1(a′n+1)

. The definition of the preference
relation of player n + 1 forces fn+1 = Id as in the proof of Lemma 6 let ψ be ψ ′ restricted to players 1, . . . , n, that is
ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn), then π(i) = p(i) and ϕi = fi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ψ ′(a′) =

ψ(a), fn+1(a′n+1)

. In CheckW(Γ1) player
n+ 1 has the following chain of strict preferences
(a, 0) ≺n+1 (a, 1) ≺n+1 (a, 2) ≺n+1 (a, 3).
As ψ ′ is a weak morphism, preferences of player n+ 1 in CheckW(Γ2) verify
ψ(a), fn+1(0)
 ≺n+1 ψ(a), fn+1(1) ≺n+1 ψ(a), fn+1(2) ≺n+1 ψ(a), fn+1(3).
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This forces u′n+1(fn+1(0)) < u
′
n+1(fn+1(1)) < u
′
n+1(fn+1(2)) < u
′
n+1(fn+1(3)) and therefore
u′n+1(fn+1(0)) = 0, u′n+1(fn+1(1)) = 1, u′n+1(fn+1(2)) = 2, u′n+1(fn+1(3)) = 3.
The only possibility to fulfill the preceding equalities is to take fn+1(a′n+1) = a′n+1 for a′n+1 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
After that we have the factorization ψ ′(a′) = ψ(a), a′n+1. Note that for any a′ = (a, an+1) it holds
u′n+1(ψ
′(a′)) = u′n+1(ψ(a), an+1) = an+1 = u′n+1(a′).
Given a = (a′1, . . . a′n), as Γ1 is a binary game it holds ui(a) ∈ {0, 1}. We define ui(a) = 1 − ui(ai) and in this case
ui(a) = (ui(a) mod 2) and ui(a) = (ui(a) mod 2). In CheckW(Γ1), given a = (a′1, . . . a′n) for any player 1 ≤ i ≤ n it
holds,
u′i(a, ui(a)) =

ui(a) = (ui(a) mod 2)
 = ui(a) = ui(a) = 0
u′i(a, ui(a)) =

ui(a) = (ui(a) mod 2)
 = ui(a) = ui(a) = 1.
Therefore (a, ui(a)) ≺i (a, ui(a)). As ψ ′ is a weak isomorphism ψ ′(a, ui(a)) ≺π(i) ψ ′(a, ui(a)) as fn+1 is the identity
(ψ(a), ui(a)) ≺π(i) (ψ(a), ui(a)). This forces u′π(i)(ψ(a), ui(a)) < u′π(i)(ψ(a), ui(a)) and consequently u′π(i)(ψ(a), ui(a)) =
0 and u′π(i)(ψ(a), ui(a)) = 1. According to the definition of u′π(i) it holds
u′π(i)(ψ(a), ui(a)) =

uπ(i)(ψ(a)) = (ui(a) mod 2)
 = uπ(i)(ψ(a)) = ui(a) = 1
therefore uπ(i)(ψ(a)) = ui(a) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ψ is a strong isomorphism. 
As we have done in the previous section we start by defining a transformation to binary actions game. The construction
of the game follows the same lines as in the BinaryAct(Γ ) (see Section 3), but now we have to guarantee an adequate
preference relation for each player. Assume that Γ = (N, A1, . . . , An, (ui)1≤i≤n). We can assume, without loss of generality,
that utilities are non negative. If this happens it is enough to add a ‘‘big positive number’’. When utilities computed by a tm
with time t we can add 2t .
BinaryActW(Γ ) = (N ′, (A′i)i∈N ′ , (u′i)i∈N ′) where N ′ = {1, . . . , k} and, for any i ∈ N ′, A′i = {0, 1} and thus the set
of action profiles is A′ = {0, 1}k. We associate to Ai a block Bi of ki = |Ai| players each one taking care of one bit.
Thus, k = k1 + · · · + kn. We split a strategy profile a′ into n blocks, thus a′ = (b1, . . . , bn) where bi ∈ {0, 1}ki .
We keep a′j to refer to the strategy of player j. Recall that, if Ai = {0, 1}ki , good(Ai) = {binify(a) | a ∈ Ai} where
binify(j) = 0j−110ki−j, good(A′) = {binify(a1) · · · binify(an) | a1 ∈ A1, . . . , an ∈ An}, and that, for a′ ∈ good(A′),
binify−1(a′) = (binify−1(b1), . . . , binify−1(bn)). For a player α that occupies position j in block Bi, the player partitions
A′ in the following sets:
X0(α) = {a′ | bi ∉ good(Ai)}
X1(α) = {a′ | bij = 0 and bi ∈ good(Ai) and a′ ∈ bad(A′)}
X2(α) = {a′ | bij = 1 and bi ∈ good(Ai) and a′ ∈ bad(A′)}
X3(α) = good(A′)
and the utility function is defined as
u′α(a
′) =

0 if a′ ∈ X0(α),
1 if a′ ∈ X1(α),
2 if a′ ∈ X2(α),
3+ ui(binify−1(a′)) if a′ ∈ X3(α),
when |Ai| = ki = 1, we have Ai = {0, 1}, binify(1) = 1 and Bi has just one player. Let α be such a player, in this case
X1(α) = ∅. When ki > 1 all the sets X0(α), . . . , X3(α) are non empty.
Observe that player α prefers profiles in X3(α) to profiles in X2(α), profiles in X2(α) to profiles in X1(α), and profiles in
X1(α) to profiles in X0(α). Moreover, player α is indifferent among two profiles belonging to the same set X0(α), X1(α), or
X2(α). For profiles a′1 and a
′
2 both in X3(α), player α keeps the preferences of player i in Γ among the profiles binify
−1(a′1)
and binify−1(a′2).
Lemma 7. Let Γ1 and Γ2 be two strategic games. Γ1 and Γ2 are weakly isomorphic iff BinaryActW(Γ1) and BinaryActW(Γ2)
are weakly isomorphic.
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Proof. Let Γ ′1 = BinaryActW(Γ1) and Γ ′2 = BinaryActW(Γ2).
Assume thatψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is a weak isomorphism between Γ1 and Γ2. Consider the mappingψ ′ = (p, f1, . . . , fk)
where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, pmaps the bits in block i of Γ ′1 to the bits in block π(i) of Γ ′2 so that the j-th bit of Bi goes to bit ϕi(j)
of Bp(i), and, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, fj is the identity function. It is straightforward to show that ψ ′ is a weak isomorphism between
Γ ′1 and Γ
′
2 .
Let us consider the reverse part. Assume thatψ ′ = (p, f1, . . . , fk) is a weak isomorphism betweenΓ ′1 andΓ ′2 . As we prove
next, all the fα , 1 ≤ α ≤ k, are identities and p induces a permutation into the blocks.
If ψ ′ = (p, f1, . . . , fk) is a weak isomorphism between the games Γ ′1 = BinaryActW(Γ1) and Γ ′2 = BinaryActW(Γ2).
We state the proof as a series of claims.
Given players α ∈ Bi and α′ ∈ Bj with i ≠ j it holds X0(α) ≠ X0(α′). When ki ≠ kj the proof is direct because X0(α) has a
cardinality 2k−ki(2ki − ki) which is different from the cardinality of X0(α′). Consider the case ki = kj. Assume that block i
precedes block j and consider a profile schematized as follows
a = (b1, . . . bi−1, badi, bi+1, . . . , bj−1, godj, bj+1, . . . , bn)
where badi is a bad profile in Ai and goodj is a good profile in Aj. It holds a ∈ X0(α) but a ∉ X0(α′).
Given the permutation p map and a player α, sets X0(α) and X0(p(α)) are both non empty. Player α occupies forcedly a position
into a block; suppose that Bi is such a block. As good(Ai) has ki ≥ 1 elements the set Ai \ good(Ai) contains 2ki − ki > 0
elements. By the same reason X0(p(α)) is not empty.
It holds ψ ′(X0(α)) = X0(p(α)) for any player α. First note that ψ ′(X0(α)) ⊆ X0(p(α)). Otherwise there is a′ ∈ ψ ′(X0(α)) \
X0(p(α)) and a′′ ∈ X0(p(α)) (because X0(p(α)) is not empty) such that a′′ ≺p(α) a′. Then ψ ′−1(a′′) ≺α ψ ′−1(a′) but this
is impossible because ψ ′−1(a′) ∈ X0(α) and therefore, ψ ′−1(a′) is a less preferred element. Suppose that ψ ′(X0(α)) ≠
X0(p(α)). Let a′ ∈ X0(p(α)) \ ψ ′(X0(α)) and consider ψ ′−1(a′). If ψ ′−1(a′) belongs to X0(α) we get a contradiction. If we
assume ψ ′−1(a′) ∉ X0(α), exists b ∈ X0(α) such that b ≺α ψ ′−1(a′). Then ψ(b) ≺p(α) a′, but this is impossible because a′ is
a less preferred element.
It holds p(Bblock(α)) = Bblock(p(α)) for all α. Let α and α be players in block Bi, that is block(α) = block(α′) = i. As
X0(α) = X0(α′) it holds ψ(X0(α)) = X0(p(α)) = X0(p(α′)). Both X0(p(α)) = X0(p(α′)) iff block(p(α)) = block(p(α′)).
Thus, ψ ′ induces a permutation π on {1, . . . , n} such that π(Bi) = Bπ(i) moreover π(block(α)) = block(p(α)). For a
player α in position j inside block Bi, let ϕ(j) be the position of player p(α) in block π(i). Therefore we define a mapping
ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn).
It holds ψ ′(X1(α)) = X1(p(α)) for any player α. There are two cases depending on the values of the ki corresponding to
the block containing α. Consider first the case ki = 1, in this case Bi = {0, 1} and Xi(α) = ∅. We have p(Bi) = Bπ(i) = {0, 1}
and X1(p(α)) = ∅. Consider the case ki > 1. As ψ ′ is a bijection between strategy profiles and there is a bijection
between X0(α) and X0(p(α)) we have ψ(X1(α)) ⊆ X1(p(α)) ∪ X2(p(α)) ∪ X3(p(α)). If exists a′ ∈ X1(α) such that
ψ ′(a′) ∈ X2(p(α)) ∪ X3(p(α)), exists b ∈ X1(p(α)) such that b ≺p(α) ψ ′(a′). Therefore ψ ′−1(b) ≺α a′, but this is impossible
because ψ ′−1(b) cannot be an element of X0(α). Thereforeψ(X1(α)) ⊆ X1(p(α)). Asψ(X1(α)) and X1(p(α)) have the same
number of elements we conclude ψ(X1(α)) = X1(p(α)).
It holdsψ ′(X2(α)) = X2(p(α)) for any player α.We haveψ ′(X2(α)) ⊆ X2(p(α))∪ X2(p(α)) and by similar arguments we
conclude the equality.
It holds ψ ′(X3(α)) = X3(p(α)) for any player α. As ψ ′ is a bijection and ψ ′(X2(α)) ⊆ X2(p(α)), this forces equality.
We have that fα is the identity, for any player α. Note that α belongs to a block of players Bi, i = block(α) having
Ai as the corresponding alphabet. We consider two cases depending on the size of Ai. First, we consider the case such
that Ai has just one element. In this case good(Ai) = {1}. As ψ(good(Ai)) = good(Aπ(i)) = {1} this forces to fα to be
the identity. Consider the case where Ai contains most than one element. Suppose that α occupies the position j in Bi
and consider the profile a′ = (b−i, 0j−110ki−j) belonging to X2(α) as ψ(a′) belongs to X2(p(α)) we need a factorization
ψ(a′) = (ψ(b−i), 0ϕi(j)−110ki−ϕi(j)) and this forces to fα to be the identity.
Given a strategy profile a in Γ1 it holds ψ ′(binify(a)) = binify(ψ(a)). Note that Ai = {1, . . . , ki} and for j ∈ Ai we have
binify(j) = 0j−110ki−j ∈ Ai. As p(Bi) = Bπ(i), we have ψ(binify(j)) = 0ϕi(j)−110ki−ϕj(j) ∈ Aπ(i) and we conclude the result.
Given two profiles a, a′ and a player i in Γ1 and a player α in Γ ′1 such that block(α) = i it holds that a ≺i a′ iff
binary(a) ≺α binary(a′). This happens because we have equalities like uα(binary(a)) = ui(a) + 3. The same property
holds for Γ2 and Γ ′2 .
The mapping ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is a weak morphism between Γ1 and Γ2. Suppose that in Γ1 we have a ≺i a′, let in
Γ ′1 a player α such that block(α) = i, then it holds binify(a) ≺α binify(a′). As ψ ′ is a weak morphism ψ ′(binify(a)) ≺p(α)
ψ ′(binify(a′)) and therefore, changing ψ ′ into ψ , binify(ψ(a)) ≺p(α) binify(ψ(a′)). Then it holds ψ(a) ≺block(π(α)) ψ(a′), as
block(π(α)) = π(block(α)) = π(i)we finally obtain ψ(a) ≺π(i) ψ(a′).
Therefore, we consider a player permutation π on {1, . . . , n}. For a player α in position j inside block Bi, let ϕ(j) be the
position of player p(β) in block π(i). It holds that (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is a weak isomorphism between Γ1 and Γ2. 
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Next is to transform weakly isomorphic games into strongly isomorphic games. The transformation consists on coding
precedence relations into utilities. Given a binary actions game Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) where N = {1, . . . , n} and
Ai = {0, 1}, consider the following game.
FlipW(Γ ) = (N, (A′i)i∈N , (u′i)i∈N) where A′i = {0, 1}2. Let a′ = (a1b1, . . . , anbn) be a strategy profile in game
FlipW(Γ ), define driver(a′) = (a1, . . . , an) = a and flipper(a′) = (b1, . . . , bn) = b. We note shortly a′ = a ↑ b.
For xy ∈ {0, 1}2 define
flip(xy) =

x if y = 0,
x if y = 1.
Let a′ = (a1b1, . . . , anbn) be a strategy profile in game FlipW(Γ ), define
flip(a′) = (flip(a1b1), . . . , flip(anbn)).
Observe that flip(a′) is a strategy profile in game Γ . Given a strategy profile a′ = (a1b1, . . . , anbn), for any player i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, we define:
u′i(a
′) =

5 if ui(flip(a′)) < ui(driver(a′)) and bi = 1
4 if ui(flip(a′)) = ui(driver(a′)) and bi = 1
3 if ui(flip(a′)) > ui(driver(a′)) and bi = 1
2 if ui(flip(a′)) < ui(driver(a′)) and bi = 0
1 if ui(flip(a′)) = ui(driver(a′)) and bi = 0
0 if ui(flip(a′)) > ui(driver(a′)) and bi = 0.
Example 6. Consider the game Γ
Player 1
Player 2
0 1
0 0, 0 1, 0
1 0, 1 0, 0
Γ
It holds (1, 0) ≺1 (0, 1). Let us see how this preference is coded as an utility in FlipW(Γ ). To transform a = (1, 0) into
(0, 1), both bits in (1, 0) have to be flipped, therefore the flipper is b = (1, 1) and we code the transformation in FlipW(Γ )
with the strategy profile a′ = (11, 01) = (1, 0) ↑ (1, 1) = a ↑ b. We have driver(a′) = (1, 0), flipper(a′) = (1, 1)
and flip(a′) = (0, 1). To compute u′1(a′), we look at the flipper of first player, as b1 = 1 and u1(1, 0) < u1(0, 1) we get
u′1(a′) = 3. Consider a case of indifference, for instance (0, 0) ∼2 (0, 1). The driver is a = (0, 0), the flipper is b = (0, 1)
and a′ = (00, 01) = a ↑ b. As b2 = 1 we get u′2(a′) = 4.
Lemma 8. Let Γ1 and Γ2 be two binary actions games. Γ1 and Γ2 are weakly isomorphic iff the games FlipW(Γ1) and FlipW(Γ2)
are strongly isomorphic.
Proof. Let Γ ′1 = FlipW(Γ1) and Γ ′2 = FlipW(Γ2).
Let ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) be a mapping between two binary actions games Γ1 and Γ2. Let ψ ′ = (π, f1, . . . , fn) be a
mapping between Γ ′1 and Γ
′
2 verifying fi(aibi) = ϕi(ai)bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Taking µ = (π, id1, . . . , idn), for any a′ = a ↑ b it
holds ψ ′(a′) = ψ(a) ↑ µ(b).
Moreover we prove that flip(ψ ′(a′)) = ψ(flip(a′)). Given a′ = (a1b1, . . . , anbn) = a ↑ b with a = (a1, . . . , an)
and b = (b1, . . . , bn). In all the mappings ψ , µ and ψ ′ the bijection function π maps player i into player π(i). We have
ψ(a) = (aˆ1, . . . , aˆn) with aˆπ(i) = ϕ(ai) for all i. We have µ(b) = (bˆ1, . . . , bˆn) with bˆπ(i) = bi for all i. Moreover
ψ ′(a′) = (aˆ1bˆ1, . . . , aˆnbˆn)with aˆibˆi = ϕi(ai)bi for all i. Therefore ψ ′(a′) = (aˆ1, . . . , bˆn) ↑ (bˆ1, . . . , bˆn) = ψ(a) ↑ µ(b).
Let us consider the behavior of the flips. Given a′ = a ↑ b, note that ψ(flip(a′)) = flip(ψ ′(a′)) is equivalent to
ψ(flip(a ↑ b)) = flip(ψ(a) ↑ µ(b)). Component wise this equality corresponds to ϕi(flip(aibi)) = flip(ϕi(ai)bi). As flip, as a
boolean function is flip(xy) = xy+ xy, the preceding equality is ϕi(aibi + aibi) = ϕi(ai)bi + ϕi(ai)bi. As ϕi is a permutation
on {0, 1}, the only possibilities are ϕ(ai) = ai or ϕ(ai) = ai. The equation trivially holds for identity. When ϕi is a negation
it is enough to check that¬(aibi + aibi) = aibi + aibi.
Assume thatψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is a weak isomorphism between games Γ1 and Γ2. Consider the games Γ ′1 and Γ ′2 , and
the morphism ψ ′ = (π, f1, . . . , fn)where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, fi(aibi) = ϕi(ai)bi.
Nowwe have thatψ ′ is a strong isomorphism betweenΓ ′1 andΓ
′
2 . We have to prove u
′
i(a
′) = u′π(i)(ψ ′(a′)). The utility can
have 6 different values. Assume that exists a′ such that ui(a′) = 6. Factorizing a′ = a ↑ b, this is equivalent to ui(flip(a′)) <
ui(a). It holds uπ(i)(ψ(flip(a′))) < uπ(i)(ψ(a)) because ψ is a weak isomorphism. Therefore, ψ(flip(a′)) = flip(ψ ′(a′)) and
ψ ′(a′) = ψ(a) ↑ µ(b). But, as uπ(i)(flip(ψ ′(a′))) < uπ(i)(ψ(a)), we conclude u′π(i)(ψ ′(a′)) = 6. For other utility values the
proofs are similar.
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Ifψ ′ = (π, f1, . . . , fn) is a strong isomorphism between Γ ′1 and Γ ′2 the definition of the utility functions of player i forces
that for any action aibi, fi(aibi) = ϕi(ai)bi for some permutation ϕi on {0, 1}. Consider the morphism ψ = (π, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)
and a profile a′ = (a1b1, . . . , anbn), observe that flip(ψ ′(a′)) = ψ(flip(a′)).
Taking into account this fact and that ψ ′ preserves utilities, we can show that ψ is a weak isomorphism between Γ1
and Γ2. Consider the sets Zero(i) = {a′|a′ = (a′−i, ai0)} and One(i) = {a′|a′ = (a′−i, ai1)}. Note that a′ ∈ Zero(i) iff
u′i(a′) ∈ {0, 1, 2} and a′ ∈ One(i) iff u′i(a′) ∈ {3, 4, 5}, moreover the following holds
• For n > 0, every set Zero(i) and One(i) contain 4 22n−1 > 0 elements each one.
• Are disjoint, Zero(i) ∩ One(i) = ∅ and Zero(i) ∪ One(i) = A′1• It holdsψ ′(Zero(i)) = Zero(π(i)). If this is false,ψ ′(Zero(i))∩One(π(i)) ≠ ∅ and therefore exists a′ ∈ Zero(i) such that
u′i(a′) ∈ {0, 1, 2} but utilities u′π(i)(ψ ′(a′)) ∈ {3, 4, 5}. This cannot happen because ψ ′ is a strong isomorphism.
• Similarly ψ ′(One(i)) = One(π(i)).
• The player’s bijections verify fi(aibi) = ϕi(ai)bi for some permutation ϕi on {0, 1}. This is just another way to write
ψ ′(Zero(i)) = Zero(π(i)) and ψ ′(One(i)) = One(π(i)).
Let us prove that ψ is a weak isomorphism. Assume that in Γ1 exists a and aˆ such that ui(a) < ui(aˆ), we have to prove
uπ(i)(ψ(a)) < uπ(i)(ψ(aˆ)). Given the inequality ui(a) < ui(aˆ), let b be the flipper such that flip(a ↑ b) = aˆ. Assume
bi = 0 (case bi = 1 is similar) then in FlipW(Γ1) it holds u′i(a ↑ b) = 0. As ψ ′ is a strong isomorphism, it holds
u′i(a ↑ b) = u′π(i)(ψ ′(a ↑ b)) = 0, therefore uπ(i)(flip(ψ ′(a ↑ b)) > uπ(i)(driver(ψ ′(a ↑ b))).
As fi(aibi) = ϕi(ai)bi it holds flip(ψ ′(a ↑ b)) = ψ(flip(a ↑ b)) = ψ(aˆ). Moreover as ψ ′(a ↑ b) = ψ(a) ↑ µ(b) it holds
driver(ψ ′(a ↑ b)) = ψ(a). Finally we get uπ(i)(ψ(aˆ)) > uπ(i)(π(a)). Other cases are similar. 
Taking into account all the previous results together, it remains to show that the previous transformation can be
performed in polynomial time when the input and output game representation is fixed to be one of the considered in this
paper, as stated in the following complexity equivalence.
Theorem 8. For strategic games given in general form, the Iso problem for weak isomorphism is equivalent to the circuit
isomorphismproblem. For formula games given in general form, the Iso problem forweak isomorphism is equivalent to the boolean
formula isomorphism problem. For strategic games given in explicit form, the Iso problem for weak isomorphism is equivalent to
the graph isomorphism problem.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that for a strategic game in general form a description in general form the games
constructed in this section can be computed in polynomial time. The same happens when the original and the target
representation is a formula game in general form or a game in explicit form. In consequence all the game constructions
this section show polynomial time reductions between different isomorphism problems.
Lemma 6 reduces strong isomorphism for binary games to weak isomorphism. Lemma 7 reduces weak isomorphism to
weak isomorphism for binary actions games. Lemma8 reducesweak isomorphism to strong isomorphism. Finally, Lemmas 2
and 3 establish the reduction from strong isomorphism to strong isomorphism for binary games. Therefore, all the problems,
for the same game representation, are polynomially equivalent.
According to the complexity equivalences stated in Section 3, the claim follows. 
5. Further results and open problems
We are working toward extending the definitions of game isomorphism. There are still some other ways to relax the
notion of isomorphismwhile maintaining some structure of the Nash equilibria, besides the strong andweak isomorphisms
considered in this paper. In particular we are interested in isomorphism with minimum requirement on maintaining
partially the structure of Nash equilibria. On another line it is of interest to extend the notion of game isomorphisms to
other game families, in particular for strategic games given in implicit form. The main difficulty here is to select a suitable
succinct representation of permutations on the set {0, 1}k to being able to represent amorphism.We expect the Iso problem
for games in implicit form (with utilities given by TM, circuits or formulas) to be computationally harder than for games in
general form. Observe, that for strategic games in implicit form the reductions in this paper will not longer be polynomial
time computable as the number of strategy profile will be exponential in the size of the representation. Another family of
interest is that of extensive games. We would like to study the isomorphism problem for such games avoiding the use of
strategic forms. An interesting open question is finding suitable definition of game isomorphisms for games without perfect
information.
A second line of research is to obtain more information about the classification of strategic games with the same number
of players according to the structure of classes induced by the type of isomorphism, the pure Nash equilibria. A first naive
approach is to consider games as equivalent if they have the same number of Nash equilibria. The counting of pure Nash
equilibria has been undertaken via probabilistic analysis by Powers [21]. She studied the limit distributions of the number
of pure strategies Nash equilibria for n players strategic games. Further results in [14]. Just counting pure Nash equilibria is
different from strong and weak isomorphism as the notions provide a finer classification.
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